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Abstract 
A browser is a convenient way to access resources located remotely on computer net-
works. Security in browsers has become a crucial issue for users who use them for sen-
sitive applications without knowledge ofthe hazards. This research utilises a structure 
approach to analyse and propose enhancements to browser security. Standard evalua-
tion for computer products is important as it helps users to ensure that the product they 
use is appropriate for their needs. Security in browsers, therefore, has been evaluated 
using the Common Criteria. The outcome of this was a security requirements profile 
which attempts to formalise the security needs of browsers. The information collected 
during the research was used to produce a prototype model for a secure browser pro-
gram. Modifications to the Lynx browser were made to demonstrate the proposed 
enhancements. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Today's society is truly reliant on the Internet. The Internet has everything for every-
body, for example Internet games for fun-loving young people, reference materials for 
studious people, news for people who want to keep up-to-date, electronic commerce 
for business people and their customers, instant communication for governments and 
businesses, and the list goes on. Making use of Internet technology, an organisation 
can set up a private network, an intranet1 or an extranet2, where core business func-
tions can operate. With an intranet, organisations can gain numerous benefits, such as 
online meeting arrangements, simultaneous email delivery, business database accessi-
bility, online directory access, processing order forms, and so on. 
Users need a browser to access servers residing on local networks, intranets, ex-
tranets, or the Internet. A browser is an application that allows users to gain access to 
private and public networks, and obtain benefits from additional features such as ac-
cessing email servers, transferring non-text files (e.g., audio, video, etc), and database 
access. 
Browsers were implemented for use in accessing shared information within an or-
ganisation where security was not considered important [27]. Millions of computers 
are now connected across the world and are used for transferring sensitive informa-
tion. To access remote servers, the only requirement is a computer, which is becoming 
1 A network belongs to an organisation, usually a corporation, accessible only by the organisation's 
members, employees, or others with authorisation [30]. 
2 An extranet provides various levels of accessibility to outsiders if they have a valid usemame and 
password, and their identity determines which parts of the extranet they can view [29]. 
1 
cheaper and cheaper, and a browser that can be obtained freely and operated easily. 
In the light of these availabilities, some people use the Internet without understanding 
how vulnerable they are. Perhaps surprisingly, people with knowledge of the potential 
exposure to threats on the Internet still use it because the Internet and browsers offer 
simple, efficient, and effective ways of communicating and trading. 
An attacker could access information during transmission between two machines 
(which includes computers, switches, firewalls, routers, etc) [34]. Incorrect informa-
tion or data coming from the Internet can cause serious problems as it could lead to-
ward financial losses or affect a sensitive issue such as the relationship between two 
countries. In addition to this, flaws in enhancement features embedded into browsers 
have caused serious security breaches. It has been shown that Java, for example, could 
execute arbitrary machine instructions, could initialise a connection with an arbitrary 
host, could bypass the Java security manager, and was vulnerabe to denial-of-service 
attacks [16]. A further example is JavaScript, which can read or upload files stored 
on the user's machine, intercept the user's e-mail address and password, monitor the 
user's activities and capture the URLs the user viewed, and then transmit information 
collected to malicious servers on the Internet or across browser frames allowing one 
browser window to spy on others [40]. A flaw exists in the Windows Script Engine 
for JScript3 can exploit by an attacker by constructing a web page that would execute 
code with the user's privileges. This could happen when the user visits that web site 
or the user are sent a link to that web page directly in an email [64]. Another secu-
rity problem in browsers comes from ActiveX4 , because they are native code and have 
nothing standing between them and the operating system. Therefore it is important for 
browsers that they always communicate with the server that delivers safe code. Patches 
for some of these problems are available but many administrators do not apply them to 
the networks they are responsible for in timely fashion, if they apply them at all. 
There is another security issue which arises where authentication is necessary in 
end to end communication. Modem browsers have an embedded security feature, the 
Secure Sockets Layer protocol, whereby a browser and a server can mutually authenti-
3 JScript is the Microsoft implementation of the European Computer Manufacturers Association 
(ECMA) 262language specification standard [65]. 
4 ActiveX is a technology developed by the Microsoft Corporation for distributing software over the 
Internet. It can be embedded in a Web page for a scrolling marquee, a background sound generator, and 
an ActiveX control to execute Java applets [11]. 
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cate using certificates issued by a Certificate Authority (CA). In general, users assume 
that they are communicating with a server they intend to, and this hypothesis is backed 
up by modem browsers by displaying a confirmation text message or a picture of a 
lock appearing [43]. If the server's certificate is forged or browers are tricked into talk-
ing to a different web server than the intended one (known as server spoofing), then 
the security supported by TLS will fail and it is likely that the users will not know (as 
the browser will still display the confirming text or a lock) whether the server they are 
communicating with is the actual server or a malicious one [ 43]. The Internet Explorer 
has some vulnerabilities effecting certificate validation. The two newly discovered 
vulnerabilities show that both of which could enable an attacker to spoof trusted web 
sites [ 66]. In the first vulnerability, digital certificates from web servers are validated 
without checking verification that the certificate has not expired, verification that the 
server name matches the name on the certificate, and verification that the issuer of the 
certificate is trusted. The second vulnerability could enable a web page to display the 
URL from a different web site in the IE address bar during a valid SSL session with 
the impersonated site. Both vulnerabilities could be used to trick a user to connect the 
attacker's web site and provide sensitive information. However, this vulnerability only 
affects how certificates from web servers are validated. It does not affect on signing 
certificates or any other type of certificate are validated. The vulnerability also need to 
provide a way to force users to the attacker's web site such as DNS spoofing or similar 
attack [ 66]. To avoid these undesirable circumstances, security in browsers must be 
addressed sufficiently and accurately. 
To address security in browsers effectively involves a number of steps. First of all, 
an understanding of the browser functionality is necessary in order to identify where 
security is required within the browser. The thesis therefore begins with discussion on 
the functionality of the browsers in terms of protocols used and services provided by 
browsers. 
Secondly, a standard evaluation for browsers is conducted using the functionality 
of the browsers. Standard evaluation for a computer product is important as it helps 
users to find out whether the product they use is appropriate for their needs. Security in 
computer products has been evaluated since the 1970s and the standard pr<l:ctice for se-
curity measurement has involved identifying threats and countermeasures [9]. As such, 
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this thesis discusses security issues in browsers by identifying the potential threats and 
countermeasures for browsers. These standard security evaluation mechanisms have 
been moving towards the Common Criteria for information security evaluation (CC) 
initiated by the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO). Since the CC is 
recognised internationally as a standard for security evaluation, the security of current 
browsers was assessed using the CC's methodology and outlined in detail in this thesis. 
In the next step, the data transferring protocols used by browsers are examined 
in order to identify security issues. Browsers use a variety of protocols for network 
connection and downloading data. Hence it is important to examine these protocols 
as most security issues in browsers are related to the connection and the downloaded 
data. This research therefore selected and analysed the most commonly used proto-
cols found in current networking applications. In particular, the Hypertext Transfer 
Protocol over Transport Layer Security Protocol (HTTP/TLS) is selected for the anal-
ysis, because it has been implemented in all browsers and its use will only increase as 
people need secure connections to protect their private information (for example an ac-
count name and password for online banking). The research also analysed some other 
file transfer protocols and the outcomes of that analysis are included in Appendix B. 
These alternative protocols are File Transfer Protocol (FTP); Secure Copy with Secure 
Shell protocol (SCP/SSH), that has already been widely used for establishing a secure 
connection; and File Transfer, Access, and Management protocol (FTAM), standard 
protocol to be used between different file system environments. 
Finally, the research makes use of the security evaluation results in developing a 
prototype model for a secure browser program. An existing browser was modified to 
include the identified enhancements. A summary of chapters in this thesis is given in 
the following section. 
1.1 Orga-nisation of the Thesis 
Chapter 2 starts with a history of browsers in terms of motivation, innovation, and 
progress made along the line. This chapter then analyses browser functionality in re-
lation to security and identifies three mechanisms; a connectivity mechanism, a data 
transferring mechanism, and a data presentation mechanism. The core mechanism of a 
4 
browser is the connectivity by which users are able to connect to a remote server. For 
the connection and transferring mechanisms, a browser employs the TCPIIP protocol 
suite and has certainly inherited all the advantages and disadvantages of TCP/IP. The 
analysis of browser functionality is useful for identifying where security is required in 
browsers. By following the systematic, conventional way of identifying security mea-
sures, this thesis discusses security in browsers by determining threats, vulnerabilities, 
and countermeasures. There are always threats when a browser connects to a remote 
server and downloads data, and they are critical if inadequate security is employed 
to the host operating system. Common countermeasures in use today are: deploy-
ing secure protocols for connection and data transferring, scanning contents of the 
downloaded file, and creating trusted operating environments by making use of host 
security tools. When a security tool for each protection is deployed, problems arise as 
the number of software flaws increases proportionally. Also many tools require human 
interaction and a considerable amount oftime to operate. 
As mentioned above, evaluation is important as it helps users to measure security 
in browsers. Therefore Chapter 3 introduces the Common Criteria (CC), the interna-
tional standard for security evaluation. Before the CC was available, there were four 
standards for security evaluation but they are recognised only by a specific geographi-
cal area, for example the Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) had 
been employed in the United States and the Information Technology Security Evalu-
ation Criteria (ITSEC) had been exercised in European countries. As they were not 
accepted by other countries, it became a dilemma when computer products were im-
ported. The ISO solved tllis problem by developing an international standard, known 
as the Common Criteria, in the early 1990s. The CC defines three constructs - a pro-
tection profile (PP), a security target (ST), and packages - allowing product developers 
and users to be able to identify a specific evaluation set for their product. 
This research followed the approach recommended in the CC for developing pro-
tection profiles and produced a Security Requirements Profile (SRP) for Browsers. 
Chapter 4 shows details of the sequence of processes used during the profile devel-
opment and the selection criteria for the chosen security components of the profile. 
The profile, as the CC standard, contains six sections: introduction; "Target Of Eval-
uation" (TOE), a definition of a product or system; security environment of the TOE; 
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objectives of the profile; security requirements; and rationale. The profile is attached 
in Appendix A. 
The research then assessed the most commonly used current browsers and the ser-
vices they employ from the host operating systems. The findings of this evaluation 
are included in Chapter 5. Netscape and Internet Explorer have been chosen as they 
are the most popular commercial browsers, and other selected browsers are Opera and 
the Lynx text browser. Since browsers make use of user identity and access control 
mechanisms provided by the OS, Windows 2000 and RedHat Linux version 7.3 have 
also been selected for evaluation with respect to these two features. 
This research has found that security in browsers is inadequate for what they are 
used for, such as in current vital business operations. However, this research shows that 
an existing browser can be modified in order to implement an enhanced secure browser 
with which management and enforcement of browser security can be achieved easily. 
Hence, in Chapter 6, · the research introduces a prototype model presenting a frame-
work for a secure browser program that can be used to securely communicate with a 
remote serveJ. The model consists of three mechanisms providing access control on 
the program, mutual authentication between a server and a user, and a secure channel 
between hosts. Some components will interact with the underlying operating system 
in order to complete their tasks. Each component of the model is discussed in terms 
of functionality, and interaction with other components or the underlying operating 
system. 
Once the model is designed, it is necessary to experiment with a browser to demon-
strate the results of the research. Therefore the source code of the Lynx browser was 
modified to implement some security features identified by the design requirements 
such as trusted channels between browsers and servers, user data protection, and se-
curity audit. The research experiment shows that the enhanced features can make 
browsers much more secure and that the required security features (highlighted by this 
research investigation) are achievable. 
The conclusions, Chapter 7, provides a summary of the outcomes of this work and 
discusses further research possibilities. 
Appendix A contains the Security Requirements Profile (SRP) for browsers de-
veloped by the thesis author and the research supervisors, Rose-Marie Henderson and 
6 
Andrew Clark. Appendix B discusses the common used file transferring protocols in 
a networked environment, namely File Transfer Protocol (FTP), Secure Copy (SCP) 
and Secure Shell (SSH), and File Transfer, Access, and Management protocol (FTAM). 
This discussion includes general functionality and overview analysis for each protocol, 
and the protocol comparison and analysis. 
7 
Chapter 2 
Browser Security 
A browser is a client application that is used to access information stored on servers. 
With browsers, users cannot only have access to private and public networks, they can 
also gain benefits from additional features which are embedded into browsers as en-
hancements and for users' convenience. Such features include accessing email servers, 
transferring non-text files (e.g., audio, video), and database access. Thereby browsers 
have become invaluable tools for network environments and e-commerce where cus-
tomers can deal with businesses through the Internet. 
As browsers have a simple interface and are easy to use, the number of users is in-
creasing and these users have varying degrees of technical competency. In addition, the 
browser is used for a multitude of different applications. For example home users use 
a browser to perform daily functions (e.g., banking, buying goods, communications, 
etc) while government departments and businesses use them for their core functions. 
As more and more browsers are used in such functions, security is becoming a crucial 
issue for users and organisations alike. This is especially true for organisations whose 
users rely on browsers for performing business critical operations. 
This chapter aims to analyse browser functionality as this will provide the neces-
sary information for locating where security in browsers currently resides. Following 
a systematic approach used widely today, the security of the browsers is addressed by 
studying the threats, vulnerabilities, and countermeasures. The layout of the chapter is 
as follows. 
This chapter consists of six sections. The first section, Section 2.1, discusses 
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the functions of browsers in terms of protocols used, common services provided by 
browsers, and associated applications. Section 2.2 highlights threats in the connection 
level, downloaded data, and host systems. Then browser vulnerabilities and counter-
measures are examined in Section 2.3 and Section 2.4, respectively. This is followed 
by Section 2.5, which discusses the related works that aim to provide browsers with 
security in specific ways. Finally, Section 2.6 contains a summary of the chapter. 
2.1 Overview of Browser Functionality 
Browsers require a number of protocols to accomplish their various functions. These 
protocols fall into three groups according to the function they perform: 
• Connectivity: The protocol suite commonly used for networking is the TCP liP 
protocol suite. 
•. Transferring data: The protocols used for this function are HTTP, FTP, etc. In 
this work only HTTP is considered as it is used most widely. 
• Presentation: Browsers can display files and their embedded pictures if the 
downloaded file is HTML. Other types of files may be handled by plug-ins, or 
helper applications (see below). 
Browsers make use of services provided by the underlying OS and other applica-
tions, called "Helper Applications". The OS assigns access attributes to restrict access 
to browsers and their associated files. It also provides browsers with user identification 
and authentication mechanisms and some system calls. When browsers create user 
associated files such as history files, they use such system calls to obtain user ID, time, 
etc. Browsers then pass the created file to the OS for access control and storage pur-
poses. For file types, browsers use the MIME mechanism to determine file type and 
if the file type is "text/html" then they display the file [20]. For other file types such 
as "application/pdf', browsers check the file name extension against the list of regis-
tered file types provided by the OS to find its associated application. If the associated 
application is found in the list, the file is passed to the application for further process; 
otherwise browsers prompt users to save the file. System administrators can modify 
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the registered file types list or add new file types into the list by entering a new file type 
extension and selecting an associated application from available applications displayed 
by the OS. Section 2.1.2 contains detailed information about helper applications. 
As discussed above, browsers rely on the underlying OS for many services. There-
fore, the browser security may be affected if the OS security is compromised by any 
malicious action such as virus. Thus it is important to ensure that the OS maintains an 
appropriate security level at least for the components which provide functions to the 
browsers, such as authentication mechanism. The research addresses the security level 
ofbrowsers in Chapter 4 where the security level of the OS is discussed as well. The 
following sections outline the thorough analysis of the browser services. 
2.1.1 Common Services Provided by the Browser 
All services, supported by browsers, have been implemented with the aim to provide 
a basic functionality which can be described as presenting information obtained from 
the server. The data transferring service, for instance, allows users to download a file 
from a remote server. In response to the user's request, the browser first finds the 
specific server on the Internet/Intranet, establishes a connection between them, and 
then requests the server to transfer the file. The most common protocol utilised for 
communication between the browser and the server is the HyperText Transfer protocol 
(HTTP) which is discussed in greater detail in Section 2.1.1.1. The browser then ob-
tains the file, and presents it to the user (or the interpretation/presentation program) in 
an appropriate format. 
The sequence of events for downloading data from a remote server can be sum-
marised as follows: 
• User chooses a URL by clicking or typing directly into the URL field. 
• The request is sent to a server (HTTP). 
• The server sends back a response that includes HTTP headers. 
• The browser uses the HTTP header to detennine how the response will be pre-
sented, for example Content-type text/html will be displayed natively by browser 
10 
and other types may be presented through the use of a "helper application" (see 
Section 2.1.2 also). 
When a browser requests a server to transfer a file, the transferred file potentially 
has to travel along physical connections passing through many computers (servers, 
switches, routers, etc). In general, these extemal systems are all unknown systems and 
their human controllers are unaccountable in terms of trust. For this reason the proto-
cols used by browsers should be implemented with some security features to protect 
the data on transmission. 
Browsers employ several different protocols to provide users the requested ser-
vices. Figure 2.1 illustrates a browser, its comniunicating parties, and essential pro-
tocols. The services and associated protocols are also shown in Table 2.1 [6]. More 
information for some ofthe services is given in Section 2.1.1.1. 
BTTP 
Figure 2.1: A browser, its communicating parties, and essential protocols. 
The reader is referred to Chapter 4 for the description of a browser. The research is 
primarily interested in the data transferring service as it is a core service in browsers. 
However, modem browsers generally support many other services. Tllis chapter there-
fore includes a brief discussion on other services for completeness. 
11 
Services Protocols Description 
Data transferring FTP File transfer protocol 
service HTTP Hypertext transfer protocol 
Internet resources WAIS Database access 
accessing services Gopher Database access 
Prosper File and directory services 
Mail service SMTP Simple mail transfer protocol 
IMAP Internet message access protocol 
POP Post office protocol 
News services NNTP Network news transfer protocol 
Interactive service Telnet Remote login protocol 
Chat Interactive real-time communication 
Multimedia Integrated service for audio visual 
data presentation 
Internet Telephony Telephone service over data networks 
Table 2.1: Browser services and their associated protocols 
2.1.1.1 Data Transferring Service 
This service satisfies users who access servers and request data transmission. Since 
this is a major service in browsers, a detailed discussion of the protocols used by this 
service and their alternatives have been included in Chapter 5. The following section 
summarises HTTP, the key data transferring protocol. 
HTTP 
The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) [5] is an application-level protocol used 
to distribute infonnation across the World-Wide Web. The first version of HTTP 
(HTTP/0.9) was a simple protocol for raw data transfer across the Internet. To im-
prove the next version, HTTP/1.0 was developed in order to allow MIME-like mes-
12 
sages to be formatted, to contain meta-information about the data transferred, and to 
include modifiers on the request/response semantics1• However, HTTP/1.0 does not 
include mechanisms for hierarchical proxies, caching, persistent connections, and vir-
tual hosts. These features are implemented in the current HTTP /1.1 protocol and it 
becomes one of the core protocols for data transfer across networks [20]. 
Being a generic, stateless protocol, HTTP works for many tasks such as name 
servers and distributed object management systems. Its main function is to carry re-
quired information for establishing a communication between two hosts. Such infor-
mation is used for negotiating application version, performing simple authentication of 
remote users, transferring data in hypertext format, and closing the connection. It can 
also negotiate data representation allowing any system to be built independently of the 
data being transferred [20]. To allow basic hypermedia access to resources offered by 
various applications, HTTP also acts as a generic protocol for communication between 
user agents and proxies/gateways to other systems (e.g., SMTP, NNTP, FTP, Gopher, 
and WAIS servers). 
I Methods I Description 
Get Retrieve data from the servers. 
Post Request the server that the enclosed information is to be treated as a 
new subordinate of the requested URI. 
Put Request the server that the enclosed information is to be stored under 
the provided URI. 
Head Request only for the header of the HTTP response to find the as so-
ciated information of a web page. 
Option Request available methods on the URI (normally a server) in order 
to determine the capabilities of a server. 
Delete Request a server to delete the resource identified in the URI. 
Trace Request the previous request message to confirm that servers receive 
the correct request. 
Table 2.2: HTTP methods and their Descriptions 
1 A detailed discussion of MIME is presented in Section 2.1.2. 
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When browsers send HTTP requests to remote servers, the first line of the message 
includes the method to be applied to the resource, the URI of the resource, and the 
HTTP version used for the request. An example of a request would be 
GET http://qut.edu.au HTTP/1.1 
There are seven request methods used in HTTP requests as shown in Table 2.2. The 
most used request methods are: "Get", "Post", and "Put". The "Get" method is used to 
retrieve data from the servers. There are three different formats used in "GET" method. 
The normal "GET" method retrieves the information identified by the requested URI. 
To reduce unnecessary network usage, browsers can use a "conditional GET" method2 
or a "partial GET" method3. If a browser sends a "conditional GET" method, the server 
will return the requested information only if the condition is met. If a "partial GET" 
method is requested, the server replies with the requested part of the entity. A security 
issue in the "GET" method is sending forms with sensitive data, which is encoded 
in the request URI. A server, proxies (if any exists), and the browsers will log the 
request URI in some place where third parties may have access. In this case the "Post" 
method must be used. The "Post" method is used when the server needs the enclosed 
information in the browser's request in order to response it. Sending a message to a 
bulletin board, newsgroup, or mailing list usually uses the "Post" method rather than 
others. 
The "Put" method requests the server to store the enclosed information under the 
provided URI. This method is used for transferring files to servers. The difference be-
tween the "Post" and "Put" methods is reflected in the consequential processing of the 
information. "Post" contains a URI that identifies the resources for data processing, 
such as a CGI gateway. In "Put" method, browser users know the intended URI and the 
information must be stored only in this URI. The other methods are "Head", "Option", 
"Delete", and "Trace". Like the "Get" method, the "Head" method requests a resource 
but it asks only for the header of the HTTP response in order to determine the infor-
mation associated with a web page, such as Content-Type. "Option" is used to request 
available methods on the URI (normally a server) in order to determine the capabili-
2The conditional GET method requests that the entity be transferred only under the circumstances 
described by the conditional header field, such as If-Modified-Since, If-Unmodified-Since, If-Match, 
If-None-Match, or If-Range header field. 
3The request message includes a Range header field. 
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ties of a server, and an example of the correct response could be "Allow: Option, Get, 
Post". The "Delete" method requests a server to delete the resource identified in the 
URI. To confirm that servers receive the correct request, the "Trace" method is used 
and a browser should receive a response containing its own previous entire request 
message. 
Many servers today (especially in e-commerce businesses) request browsers to use 
the post method when they need to obtain information from their clients. In this case 
a server embeds text messages, known as cookies, to record client ID assigned by the 
server, user visited links within the server, and other user associated information. From 
a security standpoint, cookies may violate the user privacy [32]. However, browser 
· users can choose .whether to accept all cookies, to deny all cookies, or to view the 
warning message asking the user acceptance for every cookies. Browser users can also 
control cookies through the browser configuration by listing the web sites that can or 
cannot store cookies on their computer. Since cookies originate from servers, it is also 
important to verify that a browser is communicating with a trusted server (using TLS 
connection). 
When a server receives a request from a browser requesting a file, the server usually 
sends a response message which contains status code, access authentication scheme 
if the server uses one to challenge request, and HTTP header information. The status 
codes are grouped under four classes and they are indicated by the first digit of the code 
that can be 2, 3, 4, or 5. The code starts with 2, for example "200 OK", indicates that 
the client's request was successfully received, understood, and accepted; 3, for example 
"30 1 Moved Permanently", indicates that the browser has to take further action in order 
to fulfil the request; 4, for example "404 not found", indicates client error; and 5, for 
example "501 Not Implemented", indicates a server side error. 
HTTP provides a basic authentication mechanism that uses a user identity and a 
password for each realm. The basic mechanism allows resources on a server to be par-
titioned into a set of protected areas where its own authentication mechanism is used. 
HTTP also allows browser users to send authentication information to a proxy using 
Proxy-Authenticate and Proxy-Authorization headers. It is important to note that the 
HTTP basic authentication mechanism is not secure method as it sends authentication 
information in clear text disclosing possibly sensitive infonnation. Thus, it should only 
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be used in conjunction with additional security mechanisms such as transport layer en-
cryption. 
HTTP responses also contain a standard HTTP header with a number of fields. In 
fact, these fields carry information in relation to cache, allow methods, authorisation, 
connection, URI, Content-Type, date, host, etc [20]. Additional information for these 
fields can be found in [20]. 
The Content-Type field identifies the media type of the message body sent to the 
browsers, for example: Content-Type: text!html. Servers use MIME (Multipurpose 
Internet Mail Extensions) format for the Content-Type field in order to allow data to 
be transmitted in open representations. MIME was defined in 1992 by the Internet 
Engineering Task Force (IETF) [ 4 7]. The HTTP header also includes a MIME version 
field to identify the version of MIME used to construct the message. MIME version 
1.0 is used by default in HTTP 1.1. An example of such a field is: MIME-Version: 1.0. 
MIME is discussed in greater detail in Section 2.1.2. 
In general, the HTTP header is followed by the body of the HTTP message con-
taining the browser requested file, and a response from servers is then completed. In 
Section 5.2.1, the functionality of the HTTP protocol over TLS is also discussed. 
2.1.1.2 Other Network Services 
Browsers also facilitate a number of services which allow users to exploit resources 
available in the networking environment. The service names and associated protocols 
are listed as follows. These services are not relevant to this research but are summarised 
here for completeness. 
• Internet resource accessing service: this service enables users to access resources 
such as databases, directories, and files stored in servers. The protocols used for 
this service are WAIS, Gopher, and Prospero. 
• Email service: the mail service allows users to read their e-mail stored in email 
servers and to send email. The protocols used are Simple Mail Transfer Protocols 
(SMTP) for sending mail and Post Office Protocols (POP) for retrieving mail. 
• News service: the news service provides accessibility to Internet new~ groups 
to users who have subscribed. The Network News Transfer Protocol (NNTP) is 
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used in forums for news groups [39]. 
• Interactive service: This service enables users to interact simultaneously with 
other entities. Many users access the Internet in order to use interactive services 
such as Chat, Internet Phone, or Multimedia computer networked games. 
2.1.2 Associated Applications 
As browser technology has grown to support many types of data in an integrated 
way, many applications can be ·accessed and launched by browsers using information 
from the HTTP header. As discussed in the previous section, a server's response to a 
browser includes a HTTP header containing the Content-type of the file requested. If 
the Content-type is textlhtml, the browser displays the file, otherwise it is transferred 
to the associated application. These applications extend the capabilities of browsers 
in a specific way. For example, users are able to play audio samples or view video 
movies that are initiated by browsers (example applications are RealPlayer for audio 
and Windows Media Player for video). 
As mentioned above, a mechanism that is used in browsers in order to identify 
file type is MIME, a specification for formatting non-ASCII messages that are sent 
over the Internet [21]. Servers use MIME to detennine the content of the transferred 
file and it is included in their response to browsers as "Content-type" in the HTTP 
header. There are many predefined MIME types, for instance GIF for graphics files 
and PS for PostScript files. Examples for the Content-type are: textlhtml for normal 
text, application/pdf for Adobe Portable Document Format, and application/msword 
for Microsoft Word files. It is also possible to define new MIME types by registering 
them with the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (lANA) [1]. 
There are two methods for accessing an associated application. Browsers operate 
differently according to the method of access. An application is labelled as a plug-
in application if it behaves as part of the browser (open the file within the browser 
window), or it is called a helper application if the application handles the transferred 
data independently without interaction with the browser (the application is launched 
separately). When a browser encounters a MIME type, it searches for a registered 
plug-in first. If that particular MIME type is not registered, then it looks for a helper 
application [15]. Plug-ins add a specific feature or service to browsers so that they can 
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display different types of data format such as audio, video, text, and picture. Figure 2.2 · 
illustrates the way a browser processes an HTML file containing specific embedded 
codes. 
Server Client 
Browser 
--
----! 
----- Plug-in 
---
OR----------------
Helper Application 
Figure 2.2: Data handling processes in browsers 
Some popular plug-in applications are: 
1. Sun Java: The Java Plug-in allows the execution of applications called "ap-
plets" that are written in the Java programming language [60]. When a user 
accesses a Java plug-in embedded web page, applets are downloaded onto the 
user's computer in order to process a particular function (e.g., online chat, cal-
culating mortgage interest, images in 3D, etc). This technology is also used by 
organisations for intranet applications and inter-business communication. 
2. Apple QuickTime: The Apple QuickTime plug-in supports QuickTime anima-
tion, music, audio, video, and Virtual Reality panoramas to be run on a Web 
page [37, 3]. A "fast-start" feature in the QuickTime Plug-in can display some 
part of the content while it's still downloading . It can be used within firewall 
and the server needs no special server software. 
3. Adobe Acrobat: Adobe Acrobat allows user to view and print Adobe Portable 
Document Format (PDF) files on all computer platforms [37, 33]. 
4. Macro media Flash: This program provides animation and entertainment on the 
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web. It can usually be found in web pages containing diagrams with animated 
picture and sound, cartoons, games, etc [37, 42]. 
5. RealNetworks RealPlayer: RealPlayer is designed for playing streaming au-
dio, video, and animations on the web over narrow or broad bandwidth connec-
tions [37, 50]. 
In this section the various functions that a browser may perform have been ex-
plored. Now some of the security issues associated with that functionality are exam-
ined as follows. 
2.2 Threats to Browser Services 
Browsers have been implemented with services which aim to function proficiently in 
open system environments. This goal inevitably allows people to act illegitimately, and 
their actions may result in a violation of information security in browsers or the hosts 
they run on. Consequently a question arises:. How can the browsers protect themselves 
and their associated data? To determine an answer to this question, security issues 
· are often addressed by identifying threats and their countermeasures. This approach is 
widely accepted as being the most systematic available. 
A threat can be described as the potential for abuse of protected assets. They can be 
caused by either authorised users or illegitimate users. The threats are now identified 
under the three major functionalities of browsers. 
2.2.1 Connection Level Threats 
Browsers :rely on the TCP/IP protocol suite for connectivity. The Internet Protocol 
(IP) is unreliable (delivery of packets is not guaranteed). The Transmission Control 
Protocol (TCP) provides a connection-oriented, reliable service which runs on top of 
IP [54]. The "reliable service" provided by TCP only means that data is delivered 
to the specified destination and it cannot be implicitly taken that the delivered data is 
accurate and comes from the claimed source. 
TCP uses the three-way handshake connection establishment protocol as depicted 
in Figure 2.3. In short, a client first sends a synchronise (SYN) message X to a server. 
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That message is followed by the server's response containing its SYN message Y and 
an acknowledge message (ACK) for X to the client. Then the client sends the server 
an ACK message for Y to successfully complete the handshake procedure. 
SYN(X) 
-------------. . 
Client Server 
SYN(Y), ACK(X) 
~
Figure 2.3: Three-way Handshake Process in TCP 
The "reliable service" provided by TCP only means that data is delivered to the 
specified destination without providing the confidentiality and integrity of the data, 
and it cannot be implicitly taken that the delivered data is comes from the claimed 
source. This problem in combination with IP spoofing allows an attacker to initiate a 
connection while masquerading as another host [67]. 
Another well-known attack is a TCP SYN attack in which the attacking host sends 
numerous SYN messages to the victim host but no further ACK messages are sent 
[68]. This will result in half-open connections at the server end. This attack is nor-
mally used in conjunction with either an IP spoofing attack and/or a denial of service 
attack, in which the number of half-open connections exceeds the number the server 
can handle [63]. This SYN attack only affects at the server end and browsers are not 
affected by these attacks. 
A problem affecting browsers is a server spoofing attack where browsers may 
not know that the server has been spoofed and the transmitted data has been forged. 
Browsers are usually more concerned with the integrity and secrecy of the transfered 
data as any system between two hosts is able to view and alter the passing data packets 
without being detected unless additional security measures are employed (because nei-
ther TCP nor HTTP provide an cryptographic integrity or confidentiality service). The 
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current protocol used to achieve data integrity and confidentiality is Transport Layer 
Security (TLS). Section 5.2.1 discusses TLS in detail. 
2.2.2 Threats to Content Data 
Browsers commonly use HTTP and FTP for data transmission and these two protocols 
carry any type of data provided by servers. None of the current browsers can filter 
based on the content type of the downloaded file even though accurate file types can 
be used to decide whether or not the downloading should continue. On the other hand 
servers could provide files as long as pennissions set on the files are appropriate, for 
example when read permission is set. 
As has been discussed in the previous section, data can be easily altered during 
transmission. It could happen along the wire or at transit computers such as routers, 
and there are no mechanisms to prevent or detect such changes. 
The final threat to data security that is considered here lies on a mechanism that de-
termines file content type. Browsers use Content-type information in the HTTP header 
sent by servers, and the server typically determines Content-type according to the file 
name extension (the extension is registered with lANA as discussed in Section 2.1.2). 
This could cause an undesired occurrence when the file name misrepresents the file 
content [10]. For instance if an executable code is embedded in an adobe acrobat 
reader file (.pdf), the browser will then inform the user the file type as "PDF", so the 
user will download and open the file. According to its embedded file content, the file 
could be executed on the local system with the privileges of the user who downloads 
the file [34]. This behaviour results in a vulnerability that allows attackers to bypass 
security measures. 
2.2.3 Host Threats 
Some functions in browsers require interaction with the underlying operating system. 
The· significant example, in relation to security issues, is the user authentication fimc-
tion, and the access control function for browsers, their associated data and its corre-
sponding applications. In short, the security level of browsers and their data are the 
same with the underlying operating system as they reside and rely on host computers 
in terms of security measures. 
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Furthermore, the operating system can fully support browsers with its security 
mechanisms only if the surrounding environment is trusted. A simple example is that 
password authentication would not be effective if authorised users are hostile, or at-
tackers have somehow obtained a valid password, or attackers can enter into the system 
by other means. 
The malicious code in the downloaded data can also threaten host security. As 
discussed in the previous section, an associated interpreter application is launched ac-
cording to the downloaded data type; the data is then processed; and this may result in 
an unexpected situation. 
2.3 Vulnerabilities 
An understanding of vulnerabilities is required as it helps to construct security in 
browsers to overcome those vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities are attributed to er-
rors and only known errors (or vulnerabilities) have been remedied while unknown 
errors are still there to be exploited in future. The well known vulnerabilities are dis-
cussed in this section. Further information can be found in the references included. 
2.3.1 TLS Vulnerabilities 
Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) was developed by Netscape for transmitting data over a 
secure connection within networks. To form an Internet standard in the transport area, 
the IETF designed the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol that is based on the 
specifications of SSL [17]. TLS encrypts data that is transferred over the TLS con-
nection. Many web sites use the TLS protocol to obtain confidential user information, 
such as credit card numbers. An TLS connection can be started by using "https:" in 
URLs (instead of"http") [22]. 
There are some vulnerabilities in the implementations of TLS. Many of them are 
concerned with certificates (which contain public keys) that are used for authentication 
and to generate a session key for data transmission. Many of the problems described 
here are not specific problems with TLS. Instead they typically result from errors made 
by the programmers implementing TLS. 
When certificates are used for user authentication, the private key of the user must 
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be used. The private key is normally stored in encrypted form on hard disks, but it 
is decrypted and stored in memory when it is in use. Hence it may be possible that 
the private key can be recovered from memory if the browser has been modified or 
malicious software has been installed [57]. 
TLS uses a session key to encrypt a message for one session and therefore secu-
rity of the session provided by TLS depends very highly on the session key. In June 
1998 researchers at Bell Laboratories discovered that the session key could be found 
by analysing reports of a number of systematically structured messages from a web 
server [57]. This vulnerability is now fixed. 
With default installations of some Windows operating systems, it is relatively easy 
for an attacker to add a malicious TLS certificate to the list of trusted root CA cer-
tificates using a variety of attacks, including application vulnerabilities and viruses. 
The attacker would only then need to redirect a browser's request to a malicious server 
which proxies TLS requests, for example the malicious server would first view data, 
record personal information for future use, and finally send the data to the user in-
tended server [43]. This problem affected Microsoft IE and it can be fixed by applying 
appropriate ACLs to the related registry entry. 
Another research effort showed that users ofNetscape Navigator 4.7 or Internet 
Explorer 5.5 can be tricked by attackers providing users with forged certificates and a 
visual TLS symbol like padlock when no actual TLS connection is in use [70]. In this 
attack, users are shown usual TLS confirmation windows, users can view the server's 
certificate in the normal way, and a standard. padlock is displayed as if the TLS con-
nection has been established. Users can use this information to verify whether the 
connection is secure, but most users make a decision based on what the browser seems 
to be informing them. In this case, users may submit sensitive information via the 
insecure connection. 
The problems discussed above are caused by administrators and browser imple-
menters who lack good implementation practices and knowledge of cryptography. As 
these problems are whether exist or not is unknown to the browser users, the browser 
security evaluation by independent experts is extremely important. 
For TLS by itself, it is an adequate secure connection protocol if it is configured 
properly and is used in conjunction with a secure operating system. 
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2.3.2 Java Applets and JavaScript Vulnerabilities 
Java is an object-oriented language developed by Sun Microsystems. Java applets 
are Java programs designed to run inside the browser. Java applets can run on most 
computers because Java interpreters and runtime environments (known as Java Virtual 
Machines- JVM) are available for most operating systems [59]. Web programmers 
can implement HTML code (APPLET tag) to accommodate Java applets in web pages 
and Java applet programmers create Java system classes, calledjava.applet package 
to cooperate with the HTML tag. Like normal Java applications, Java Applets can be 
programmed to access files on the system or network resources by using appropriate 
Java packages4 • Thus, additional security mechanisms are required for the Java ap-
plets running on the host computer (the browser's host). This mechanism has been 
implemented using the applet sandbox model [ 44]. 
In the sandbox model, the downloaded applets can still be executed on the host 
computer but cannot access its resources by default. However, an applet can request 
for access to the system resources; the sandbox checks the request according to the 
appropriate applet security policy (implemented by system administrators); and the 
applet cannot perform the requested action if the check fails. The sand box mechanism 
may also allow secure code (known as trusted code) to perform an insecure action if 
the browser user is informed of such an action and agrees to it. Nevertheless, applet 
code that is located on a local file system where all Java system classes are sited, is 
treated as trusted code [ 44]. 
Java applets in a sandbox are not allowed to make network connections to other 
hosts apart from the host from which the applets were downloaded. The same re-
striction is applied to accepting connections from network hosts. In addition, applets 
placed in a sandbox cannot start other programs on the host, load libraries, or define 
Java native method calls that are implemented for a specific machine language to have 
direct access to the underlying system. Java applets use threads, a part of a program 
that can execute independently of other parts, and the sandbox mechanism ensures that 
applets can only use and control the threads they have created. 
There have been many security vulnerabilities found in the Java applet implementa-
tions. The security issues arising from Java applets have included an ability to execute 
4These language system packages are, for example, java.io, java.net. *, etc [ 44] 
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arbitrary machine instructions, a vulnerability to denial-of-service attacks, an ability 
to make networking connections with arbitrary hosts, and an ability to bypass the Java 
security manager with hand-crafted byte code. With regard to the sandbox mechanism, 
the authors of [ 44] discussed a sandbox vulnerability found in Microsoft Internet Ex-
plorer 4.0 and Internet Explorer 5.0. In this vulnerability, the sandbox would allow 
a Java applet to operate outside its boundary and perform any desired action on the 
user's computer. This problem can be rectified by applying the related patch. Like the 
SSL protocol, security flaws in Java applets are often caused by applet programmers. 
Readers can find detailed infonnation for Java applet vulnerabilities in [44]. 
JavaScript is a scripting language developed by Netscape to allow Web authors to 
design interactive sites (JavaScript can also interact with HTML source code). Al-
.though the language has some features in common with Java applets, it was developed 
independently. Problems caused by JavaScript are mostly related to violation of the 
users privacy. JavaScript can read and upload arbitrary files on the users machine, in-
tercept the users e-mail address and preferences including password, monitor the users 
activities, capture the URLs the users viewed, and then transmit information collected 
to malicious servers on the Internet. Additionally, information can be leaked across 
browser frames allowing one browser window to spy on others [ 40, 62]. 
Both Java applets and JavaScript may continue to run (and compromise the system 
if malicious codes are downloaded) even after users leave the page which has originally 
launched these programs or close the browser windows that host these programs [57, 
69]. 
2.4 Countermeasures 
In browser security, countermeasures can be described as the mechanisms necessary 
to protect against the threats identified in Section 2.2. Once threats and vulnerabili-
ties are identified, the next step is to analyse the available countenneasures supported 
by current technology. These countermeasures must be feasible in the operational en-
vironment. The following countenneasures are organised relative to the order of the 
identified threats in Section 2.2. 
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2.4.1 Secure Protocols 
Due to the vulnerabilities in the TCP/IP protocol, strong secure protocols for network 
and transport layers have been implemented and widely used in an attempt to pro-
tect the transmitted data. Therefore the security requirements profile for browsers in 
Chapter 4 includes a component (Trusted path/channels), which uses a secure network 
protocol. 
In the network layer, the latest version of the IP protocol, namely IPv6, intro-
duces a new security architecture including data authentication and encryption mech-
anisms [12]. This new security architecture includes the IP security protocol that can 
be adapted to the older IP version 4 and is known as the "IPsec" protocol. 
For the transport layer, the first implementation is Secure Socket Layer (SSL) pro-
tocol which is followed by Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. Netscape Com-
munications Corporation followed IPsec in the move toward a security architecture 
and produced SSL to be used in Netscape browsers. SSL has made use of public key 
cryptography to authenticate the communicating peers and to establish a session key 
for data encryption [47, 22]. Once a session key is set the connection is transparently 
encrypted, and confidentiality and integrity of the transmitted data are attained. 
To form an Internet standard in the transport area, the IETF designed the TLS 
protocol that is based on the specifications ofSSL [17]. These two protocols consist of 
two layers: a handshake layer, where key certificates and a session key are exchanged; 
and a record layer, which handles data processing. 
In order to make the transport layer protocols effective, some restrictions such as 
allowing SSL connections to trusted servers, using only port 443 for SSL connection, 
and limiting data amount for transfer, should be in place [ 43]. 
In the application layer, many protocols using public key cryptography have been 
created. The most widely used protocols are, for example, Secure HTTP, security Ex-
tension Architecture (SEA for HTTP), Secure Telnet (STEL ), Secure MIME, Privacy 
Enhanced Mail (PEM), Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) for email, and Secure Electronic 
Transaction (SET) forE-commerce [47]. 
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2.4.2 Content Scanning 
There is no security architecture currently built into browsers that can be used to scan 
the contents of the downloaded files. As mentioned above, the MIME protocol deter-
mines file type based on the file name extension, and the file contents could be different 
from the general description given by the file type. For example a file name with an 
extension ".doc" containing executable data such as an embedded macro is labelled as 
document file by the MIME, but that may be executed when the file is opened. 
As such, the users of the browser usually use a virus protection program which 
scans the downloaded file and reports the result. The anti-virus program checks the 
file for malicious data that is predefined by using known formats. Thus, the program 
doesn't help to corroborate that the file type given by the name is matched with the 
contents of the file. 
2.4.3 Trustworthy Operating Environment 
The operating environment falls into two categories: the environment of the host com-
puter and the host computer itself (including the interactions between the underlying 
operating system, interpreter applications, and a browser). 
Due to the fact that browsers reside and rely on host computers in terms of security 
measures, the host computers should be trusted and should operate in a trusted envi-
ronment. If this essential trusted environment is unavailable, security in browsers is 
virtually nonexistent. In other words, the host computer can only be as trusted as its 
surrounding environment. Nevertheless, creating the physically trusted environment is 
out of the scope of browsers' capabilities, but administered by the human controller. 
Therefore the profile for browsers includes the trusted environment in the Security 
Objectives for the Environment, see Section4.3.2 for detailed information. 
From the technology perspective, there are some host security tools that assist ad-
ministrators in detecting security violations. Some of the well-known host security 
tools are [ 4 7]: 
1. COPS: a shell script that invokes the collected stand-alone programs that tackle 
a different security problem with UNIX systems. Problem areas include permis-
sion of files, directories, and devices; contents of password and cron files; and 
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contents of setuid and setgid script files. 
2. Tiger: a script file that contains a set of commands to scan a UNIX system 
against a database of known vulnerabilities and security problems. 
3. TCP Wrapper: a program that consists of small daemon programs which in turn 
monitor and filter any requests for-various services in data communications. 
4. Tripwire: an integrity checker program that can be used to determine whether 
stored data has been changed since the last check. 
For file system security, the Andrew File System (AFS) mechanism can be used to 
encrypt files for storage purposes which effectively provides two security properties, 
confidentiality and integrity for data stored on hard drives [ 4 7]. 
For the whole system security, the host system should be assessed in terms of secu-
rity measures (to identify the security functionality). From the evaluation standpoint, a 
host system can be assessed by using a particular security evaluation profile. In fact this 
research has chosen to use the Common Criteria for security evaluation in information 
technology for a browser because of its international acceptance. More information on 
the CC and a security requirements profile for browsers can be found in Chapter 3 and 
Chapter 4, respectively. 
Many implementations addressing security in browsers have been developed to 
build a secure environment for them. In Janus [25] a tracing facility watches an ap-
plication process and intercepts system calls. A configuration file is used by Janus to 
determine whether or not the system call is allowed to be made. 
Using the Janus approach, another implementation has built a secure browser by 
assigning a sub-user id, which in tum determines what resources an object is allowed 
to access. In this implementation, all downloaded data is recognised as an object and 
is assigned with a sub-user id [55]. 
However these implementations are limited by the underlying operating system 
(available only for Unix platform). These implementations use a process protecting 
mechanism (providing multiple address space, allows trapping of system calls, and 
interposing proxies where necessary [25]), which is not available in MS DOS and 
Microsoft Windows. 
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2.5 Other Related work 
A relevant work addressing overall security in browser is produced by Ioannidis et al 
and they call their implementation a secure browser [55] [56]. Major concern of the 
secure browser is user privileges in terms of accessing system resources. Therefore, 
a user is assigned with a new id, namely a "sub-user id" with minimum privileges re-
stricting resource access. When a process initiated by the downloaded data requests 
access to system resources, the system takes the sub-user id as the process owner and 
therefore the system rejects the process's request. Using a sub-user id, the risk of 
malicious data attacks is low. Nevertheless, this browser cannot solve problems occur-
ring during transmission such as eavesdropping and alteration (TLS could be used to 
prevent these threats). 
While security in browsers has been addressed elsewhere, security in additional 
browser's features, such as scripting languages (for example Java scripts) and helper 
applications or plug-ins (e.g., Adobe Reader), has received the most attention and a 
number of different methods have been proposed [ 69, 25]. The script codes and helper 
applications always have the right to execute downloaded data while the data is in a 
processing state and that exposes a serious security issue. The common solution to pre-
vent this occurrence is limiting their functions and separating them. This is achieved by 
creating a predefined database table that includes only permitted functions as discussed 
in the followings. 
Anupam and Mayer create a safe interpreter for scripts by using a "padded cell" 
implementation. The script downloaded is isolated in the safe interpreter to prevent 
it from executing any unsafe commands that could compromise the system security. 
The safe interpreter also implement an access control mechanism to be used for the 
downloaded files within the script's own context [69]. For example, the data of the 
downloaded file should only have a read access. The interpreter isolates contexts from 
each other, so a user could send some information back to a specific server without 
being accessible by a script in a different context. The safe interpreter also disjoints 
multiple windows of a browser; therefore a malicious program in one window cmmot 
access other windows, and thus cannot compromise the security of the browser. How-
ever, if scripts in different contexts require mutual access (e.g., an application running 
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in multiple windows requires the ability to access data in different windows), it must 
be allowed in trusted contexts. 
While Anupam and Mayer build a safe interpreter for scripts, Goldberg et al create 
a secure environment to contain untrusted helper applications [25]. Since the data 
downloaded could have been created by an adversary and the helper applications are 
usually too complex to be bug-free [25], Goldberg et al create a "dispatch table" to 
reduce the risk of a security breach by restricting the program's access to the operating 
system. The table contains a list of system calls, associated values and functions, and 
is consulted when a helper application makes a system call. The decision on whether 
to allow or deny the call is made according to the table. Again, this implementation 
cannot solve the transmission problems. 
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Figure 2.4: A browser, threats, and countermeasures 
Browsers were invented with the aim to provide access to data stored on servers. 
Moreover, browsers provide a number of facilities such as electronic mail, electronic 
news group, web-based database access, telnet interactive login, to name a few. 
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Figure 2.4 illustrates a browser with its communicating parties, its threats, and 
countermeasures for those threats. According to Figure 2.4, threats in relation to 
browsers functionality are countered by security enhanced tools. Note that these se-
curity tools are limited to specific areas and are implemented by unrelated groups that 
may lead toward incompatibility in terms of cooperation. 
When security issues in browsers are addressed, it is necessary to lmow how much 
security is provided by the browser. Thus it is required to evaluate browsers with a se-
curity measure. Hence, the next chapter inspects an evaluation mechanism (the Com-
mon Criteria), for determining whether or not browsers meet the security requirements 
of their users. 
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Chapter 3 
The Common Criteria for Security 
Evaluation 
Computers are playing an increasingly dominant role in every aspect of modem life. 
Computers were used firstly by the military, followed by research, business, and so on. 
Today, electronic communications and transactions are effectively utilising the power 
of globalised interconnection (the Internet). 
Networking was created in research-oriented environments with the goal of free 
and open exchange of information [9]. In other words, the network pioneers were more 
interested in sharing information than securing it. Networks have grown dramatically: 
four computers were linked to form the first network and millions of computers are 
now connected across the world in what is called "the Internet". Today, organisations 
rely heavily on computer networks, thus security has become an important issue. 
Computers with Internet access serve as a basic platform to complete daily func-
tions (e.g., electronic banking, shopping, gambling, auctions, conferencing, etc) and 
are widely available (Internet cafes, libraries, etc). Internet technology is evolving 
from dial-up connections to permanent, high-speed connections. Therefore sensitive 
data (e.g., authentication data, information of the connected network) is increasingly 
exposed, heightening the need for protection. 
The security level of a computer product can be determined by measuring it against 
security evaluation criteria. Evaluation can be used to determine whether a product or 
system meets security requirements. For evaluation people are moving towards the in-
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temationally recognised standard, the Common Criteria (CC), which is currently used 
in U.S.A, Europe, Australia, and elsewhere [46]. Due to that international acceptance, 
this research has used the CC to address security requirements for browsers. 
The chapter begins by discussing the need for security evaluation of browsers in 
Section 3.1. Then Section 3.2 outlines the history ofthe CC. In Section 3.3, the CC's 
constructs are discussed, with which customers can express their security requirements 
for a particular computer product. The chapter then includes a discussion on the CC 
Relationship to Risk Analysis. Section 3.5 addresses the limitations of the CC ap-
proach and Section 3.6 provides the summary ofthe chapter. 
3.1 The Need for Evaluation 
Computer security evaluation is a process that measures the security level of a com-
puter product by using a security measurement mechanism. In other words, evaluation 
justifies the level of the security claimed by a computer product. In common with 
other computer products, browsers are subject to threats. These threats come from 
the system itself, users, or the environment [9]. System threats come from hardware 
(e.g., hardware failure) and software (e.g., flaws or configuration errors). User threats 
occur in three ways: unauthorised access; unintended error; or privilege abuse. Envi-
ronmental threats comprise natural disaster, power failure, unsatisfactory location, etc. 
These threats need to be mediated. The common approach currently used is to char-
acterise the level of security required, and to ensure that the security measures used 
consistently support these desired security characteristics. Since security evaluation 
can measure the security level of a particular computer product, evaluation is believed 
by this research as the best way to identify the level of security in browsers. 
Organisations require browsers with a degree of security to suit the nature of their 
business (e.g., while browsers used in a military agency may need the highest de-
gree of security, moderate security would be suitable for a research centre in a univer-
sity). Users in both environments desire evidence that the chosen security mechanisms 
meet their requirements. Evaluation results can help customers to determine whether 
browsers are suitable to use for their intended work. 
Organisations cooperate for many reasons, for example a joint project, to increase 
33 
business availability, etc. Some organisations may choose only to interact with other 
organisations that use evaluated products (use of evaluated products is mandated in 
some government applications). 
The alternatives to evaluation include risk assessment process, compliance with 
a quality assurance standard, and functionality testing. Organisations use risk assess-
ment to identify key system assets and the threat likelihood (wherever possible) against 
each asset, determine the consequence/harm profile against each threat, and calculate 
the current risk for each asset. The acceptable level of risk for each asset/threat pair 
is then determined, and the priority of the associated countermeasure is established in 
the process [3 5]. ISO 900 1 is the international standard for quality management sys-
tems. It includes eight components but only five are important for compliance: quality 
management system, management responsibility, resource management, product real-
isation requirements, and measurement, analysis and improvement requirements [19]. 
Functionality testing is to verify that the product performs as expected and docu-
mented [61]. This type of testing is beneficial to product developers who are creating 
a new product or an existing product which has undergone significant enhancements 
or changes in capabilities. The differences between evaluation and the alternatives are 
that the ISO 9001 and the risk assessment focus on the overall security of the organi-
sation, while functionality testing is the product developer driven assessment. 
The advantages of having an evaluated browser are significant. Users know ex-
actly what the level of security is in their browsers and that inspires confidence in its 
performance. Evaluation guards against unjustified claims regarding security by indi-
vidual vendors or organisations. In other words, evaluation provides justification of 
the claimed security characteristics of the browser. However, IT product vendors take 
advantage of evaluation by using the evaluation result. For instance, this has been done 
to promote sales of the Windows NT and Windows 2000 operating systems [49]. 
However, an evaluation rating has problems in comparing and representing. As 
the evaluation investigate the IT product to determine whether the product actually 
meets the requirements specified in its protection profile, the level of the assurance is 
varies according the profile. If the profile is written for low level security measure, for 
example, achieving high level assurance doesn't necessarily represent that the product 
is secure. Another drawback is that the same assurance level resulting from the use 
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of different profiles are actually different. Therefore, the users of the profile must 
understand these factors so they can make use of the evaluation result in an appropriate 
way. 
3.2 Background of the CC 
When people were discussing security in information technology in the 1970s, they 
accepted a need for an appropriate level of information security [9]. People in those 
days solved that problem by developing security models (e.g., Bell La Padula) [4]. 
To achieve the required level of security, the information security professional has the 
task. of measuring the security of the systems and products they acquire. The problem 
is "how can we determine what level of security is offered?" The adopted solution to 
this question was to establish a set of criteria and an evaluation method operated by an 
independent body. 
In the early 1980s, National Security Agency (NSA) developed the Trusted Com-
puter System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC), also known as "Orange Book" [9]. A 
decade later, various countries developed evaluation criteria on the basis of concepts 
of the TCSEC which are yet more flexible and adaptable to the evolving nature of 
IT [46]. In 1991, the European Commission, in a joint development ofFrance, Ger-
many, the Netherlands, and United Kingdom, undertook its own initiative and pro-
duced a set of Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC), which 
contained assurance criteria without any specific functionality. In 1993, the Cana-
dian Trusted Computer Product Evaluation Criteria (CTCPEC) were published. At the 
same time, NIST and NSA jointly developed the draft version of Federal Criteria for 
information technology security (FC). 
The International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) had begun developing an 
international standard evaluation criteria in 1990. The task was assigned to Working 
Group 3 (WG3) of Sub-Committee 27 (SC27) of the Joint Technical Committee 1 
(JTC1) [58]. 
In June 1993, CTCPEC, FC, TCSEC, and ITSEC joined their activity to form a 
single set ofiT security criteria under the CC project. This project cooperates with the 
International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) and contrihqted several versions 
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of the CC to WG3 and these versions became various parts of the ISO Criteria version 
1.0 in January 1996. The completed version 2.1, known as the International Standard 
ISO 15408, was published in August 1999 [45]. 
Many other countries are becoming involved with the CC due to the development 
of mutual recognition. Mutual recognition allows evaluations in one country to be 
accepted in other countries lowering costs for developers and consumers. Costs for 
evaluation before the CC are more prohibitive as different schemes (ITSEC, TCSEC, 
etc) placed different requirements on developers. The CC enables standardisation of 
evaluation which in tum allows mutual recognition. The current CC Version 2.1 sup-
ports a mutual recognition for Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) from 1 to 4 between 
12 nations [13]. New nations are preparing to join but not all intend to conduct evalu-
ations (e.g., at this stage Japan will rely on evaluations carried out by other nations). 
Australia is involved in the CCproject with its Defence Signals Directorate (DSD). 
The Australasian Information Security Evaluation Program (AISEP) has been accepted 
as a full member of the Common Criteria Mutual Recognition Arrangement [28]. The 
aims of the CC project are summarised by quoting from the CC [ 46]. 
"This standard will permit comparability between the results of inde-
pendent security evaluations. It does so by providing a common set of 
requirements for the security functions of IT products and systems and 
for assurance measures applied to them during a security evaluation. 
The evaluation process establishes a level of confidence that the secu-
rity functions of such products and systems and the assurance measures 
applied to them meet these requirements." 
3.3 The CC's Constructs 
The CC defines three types of constructs: package; protection profile (PP); and security 
target (ST) [ 46]. The package (e.g., an Evaluation Assurance Level) is a set of require-
ments that meets security objectives of IT products and systems. A protection profile 
is a complete set of functional and assurance requirements to address an identified set 
of security objectives [58]. PP includes reusable sets (a reusable definition of product 
security requirements that are known to be useful and effective [ 45]) and statements of 
"wants and needs" for security objects. ST is a set of security requirements provided 
by product developers, perhaps in response to a PP of a particular computer product. 
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Customers use a PP to describe their security requirements whereas developers use 
an ST to describe the security characteristics of their products. Hence, PPs are intended 
for IT consumers and STs for developers ofiT products and systems. 
Both PPs and STs address security requirements of a particular product or system 
operating in a defined environment. 
3.3.1 Protection Profile 
Protection profile states a security problem rigorously for a given set or collection of 
systems or products, lmown as the Target Of Evaluation (TOE) [45]. It also specifies 
security requirements to address that problem without defining how these requirements 
will be implemented. Therefore, a PP may be used to define a standard set of security 
requirements, with which products may claim compliance. A PP can apply to a partic-
ular type of product such as operating system, database, smart card, firewall or a set of 
products grouped together such as a system. 
There is a guideline for production ofPP available. The ISO released a draft version 
of guidelines for PP and ST in January 2000 [18] and the guide is intended to be fully 
consistent with IS015408. The guide gives details of how to identify and specify 
the standard components of PPs such as the assumptions, threats, security objectives, 
security requirements, and rationale. There are reusable combinations of functional or 
assurance components called "packages". The purpose of a package is to reduce the 
cost and the work load of PP development. The guide also includes a checklist for 
PPs, STs, and examples for PP components. Furthermore, it includes sample security 
functional requirements for cryptography, and sample protection profiles for firewall, 
database, and trusted third party. 
The CC describes the requirements for a protection profile. There are a number 
of steps, in accordance with the CC, to construct the structural outline of PP docu-
ments [2]. First of all, Target Of the Evaluation (TOE) must be described by type, 
scope, and operational environment. Security environment is then identified in three 
sections: security usage assumptions; organisational security policies; threats to secu-
rity. Given the security environment, the PP developer will be able to determine the 
security objectives for the TOE, and the environment. Knowing the security objec-
tives, functional security requirements for the objectives can be defined. Application 
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notes (additional supporting information) and rationale (the claims of the PP's com-
pleteness and cohesiveness) are optional parts of the PP as described in the CC. Figure 
3.1 portrays the content ofthe PP. 
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Figure 3.1: Components ofthe PP 
3.4 The CC Relationship to Risk Management 
There are many common themes in the CC and in risk management (e.g. both in-
volve identifying assets and threats). However, their scope is not the same, as risk 
management has to cover the overall security requirements for the organisation (e.g., 
IT products, personnel, environment, etc) whereas the CC is more technical in focus 
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and covers only IT products and systems. The outcomes of the processes are different 
in usage as well. Risk management is performed to produce a security plan for the 
organisation and the CC is used to determine the assurance level of IT products and 
systems. Organisations own and control their risk analysis process whereas CC results 
are product specific and not likely to be controlled by the organisation. The CC can 
therefore not replace risk management but rather they complement each other. 
3.5 Limitations of the CC and PP 
The CC does not address organisation policies, assumptions, the administrative and 
legal framework, qualities of cryptographic algorithms, etc [46]. The use of the evalu-
ation results in product or system accreditation is also outside the scope of the CC. 
An evaluated product is not necessarily a secure product. Evaluation only addresses 
conformance to a PP. Therefore the consumer must be satisfied that the PP meets their 
needs. In order to be fully aware of the benefits of an evaluated product the consumer 
must completely understand the goals of the PP. While this may not necessarily be a 
limitation of the CC, it is an unavoidable limitation of evaluation in general. 
The security functional and assurance requirements provided in the CC were not 
designed to be complete. Therefore authors ofPPs and STs may introduce new security 
functional and assurance requirements as necessary. Another limitation is that when 
new features are added into a computer product, a new PP for the product must be writ-
ten. This is a general problem associated with the scope of these types of documents 
(PPs and STs). 
3.6 Summary 
The CC is oriented towards specification and evaluation mechanism for IT products 
and systems, and pennits comparison between the results of independent security eval-
uations. The CC is an international standard which is being increasingly adopted by 
vendors and customers. 
The assurance level defined through evaluation inspires confidence in performance 
of the product. The security level of products is measured in a standard way, so that 
customers and. product vendors can interpret the result. 
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Even though browsers are necessary tools for every business as they are used to 
connect servers and download sensitive information, there was no PP for file down-
loading (browsers) available at the time the research was started. In the next chapter 
the need for a PP for file downloading (browsers) is highlighted. Having a PP for 
file downloading (browsers), one can at least measure a security level of a program 
to determine whether the program is suitable for its intended purpose or not. In order 
to obtain the experience of developing a PP for browsers, the research used the CC's 
idea to produce a security requirements profile for browsers, and the experience of 
developing a profile is discussed in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 4 
A Security Requirements Profile for 
Browsers 
As was discussed in Chapter 3, the Common Criteria (CC) introduced the Protection 
Profile (PP) in order to identify essential security features in particular computer hard-
ware and/ or software products [ 18]. A PP is one way users can express desired security 
properties for their nominated information technology products. The PP does not, how-
ever, dictate how these requirements should be implemented. This allows computer 
users (who do not need to know how to implement computer products) to compose a 
protection profile in order to evaluate security in the chosen computer products. 
At the time the research was started, there was no protection profile written for 
browsers (The U.S. Government and industry have produced a PP for Web browsers on 
April 21, 2001 [24]). Other relevant PP are the "Rudimentary Web Server Protection 
Profile" addressing security in web servers, developed by the Information Security 
Research Centre and "Web Server Protection Profile" issued by U.S. Government and 
industry [26]. 
In order to fulfil the needs for secure browser evaluation, the research had intended 
to compose a protection profile for browsers. Producing a protection profile is a time-
consuming and complicated task. It requires large amounts of effort and resources. 
For example if a PP for browsers is going to be produced, it requires PP authors who 
should not only have knowledge in browser security, but also have an understanding 
of the PP concept and language. In addition, it also requires a group of people who 
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realise the usefulness of the PP, and they must devote a considerable amount of time 
to oversee and give the authors advice during the PP development process (involving 
a number of revisions to ensure that the PP maintains consistency and completeness). 
This research was conducted for a Masters degree and the available resources were 
limited (two supervisors and six months for developing a profile for browsers). Hence, 
it was decided that rather than undertaking the arduous task of developing a PP, it would 
be more beneficial to focus efforts on a less rigorous analysis which borrows some of 
the methodology used by the protection profile. To highlight this distinction the profile 
produced by this research is referred as a security requirements profile (SRP). 
This chapter contains a summary of the browser SRP. It discusses the approach 
used, the sequence of processes for the SRP development, and the selection criteria 
for the chosen security components of the SRP. Sections in this chapter follow the or-
der of contents of the standardised PP document defined by the CC as in the previous 
chapter. Each section outlines what considerations have been taken into account and 
how component selections are made. The SRP is used later in the research to evaluate 
file transferring protocols used by a browser. The security requirements profile has 
been attached as Appendix A. The chapter also contains overview of the web browser 
protection profile (WBPP) developed by U.S. government and industry, and the com-
parison of the WBPP and the SRP. 
Section 4.1 describes the browser by focusing on the browser's general functional-
ity. Section 4.2 is then concerned with the security environment of the browser: it is 
important for a browser to reside in a secure environment where its security will not be 
compromised. In Section 4.3, user desired security features are depicted as objectives 
of the SRP. This is followed by Section 4.4 which lists security functionality compo-
nents with regard to the objectives listed in the previous section. Section 4.5 discusses 
the reasons behind the chosen security assurance level for the SRP. The security as-
surance level describes the security functions that must be implemented in the browser 
to operate securely. Section 4.6 covers the rationale for the SRP in order to demon-
strate that the SRP is complete and consistent. The chapter then continues to include 
an overview of the web browser protection profile and the comparison of the profile 
and the SRP in Section 4.7. The chapter completes with conclusions in Section 4.8. 
42 
4.1 Description of the Browser 
The browser is a software application used to find :files on a (remote) server and direct 
the server to fetch and transmit the requested :files as appropriate. The browser provides 
users services such as making a connection to the requested file server, making requests 
for transmission of the desired file, and delivering the obtained :files to an appropriate 
program on the requesting host for interpretation. 
Browsers have been implemented without some security functions such as user 
identification and authentication. Browsers therefore make use of some security mech-
anisms provided by the underlying OS but there are still some security functions which 
cannot be obtained from the OS. The lack of the security functionality in early browsers 
made users seek additional security software with some essential security properties. 
The significant example for this would be connection level protocols, for example TLS 
protocol, used to attain integrity of transferred data. Now almost all browsers are 
distributed with a support for TLS. For these supplementary applications/protocols, 
readers are referred to Section 2.4. 
The first section of the SRP is a statement describing the browser and the security 
problems encountered by the browser. It is necessary to have a precise description of 
browsers because later in this chapter security objectives are determined to suit the de-
scription provided here. In the CC this description is called the "Target of Evaluation". 
Nate that in Chapter 2 the definition of a browser has been outlined in general and the 
description given here specifically focuses on security functionality rather than other 
aspects such as usability. 
Figure 4.1 illustrates how a secure browser operates by showing a communication 
sequence taking place between a browser and a server, and showing interaction be-
tween a browser and an interpreter application. When the browser starts to download a 
:file from a server, it first initiates a particular network protocol to communicate with the 
server. After a communication channel is successfully setup, the secure browser (pro-
posed by this research) determines whether to proceed with downloading or to stop 
the communication according to the MIME type that is included in a HTTP header 
provided by the server. If the file type is permitted, downloading continues and the 
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Figure 4.1: The browser architecture 
browser will pass the file to an interpreter application.1 In Appendix A Section A.2, a 
browser is officially described as follows: 
The browser is a software application used to find files on a (remote) server 
and direct the server to fetch and transmit the requested files as appropri-
ate. It provides user services such as making a connection to the requested 
file server, making requests for transmission of the desired file, protection 
of transmitted data, and delivering the obtained files to an appropriate pro-
gram on the requesting host for interpretation. Figure 4.1 depicts the logical 
interaction between the client (with the browser and an interpreter applica-
tion) and a server. It proceeds with the request for downloading of the file 
only if the file type is a permitted file type. It is configurable by the user or 
an administrator to prevent the download of specified file types. 
Having officially described the browser, the next task is to investigate a secure 
environment where the browser can operate without being compromised. The next 
section describes the security environment for browsers. 
1Note that in some instances the interpretation functionality may be built-in to. the browser. For 
example, browsers interpret HTML internally. 
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4.2 Browser Security Environment 
Even ifbrowsers have strong built-in security features and have made use of protection 
mechanisms provided by the underlying operating system, it is not guaranteed that they 
will remain in a secure state. This is because such security features and protection can 
be affected by an insecure environment that includes browser users, the communicating 
servers, and so on. For example, if a user changes the browser's configuration to 
cancel the requirement of a secure connection and connects to a malicious server, then 
the security of the browser is compromised. Thus, the · enviromnent where browsers 
operate should be taken into account when security of browsers is addressed . 
. According to the CC authors, the security environment for browsers can be iden-
tified by using three properties: secure usage assumptions, threats to the browser se-
curity, and security policies applied by the organisation that utilises the browser. The 
issues in security environment define the. underlying security issues to be addressed 
when security objectives are identified in a later section. Reader can find a fonnal 
script of the browser security environment in Section A.3. 
4.2.1 Secure Usage Assumptions 
It is necessary to outline secure usage assumptions which inform the browser's im-
plementers and administrators what is necessary to establish and maintain a secure 
physical and IT environment for the secure operation of the browser. With browsers, 
secure usage assumptions are concerned with user authentication and access control 
mechanisms. Given the fact that the browser operates on top of the operating system 
(OS), the browser's authentication mechanisms cannot stop malicious users accessing 
the browser if they have been successfully authenticated by the operating system. This 
practical consideration led to the decision that the browser is to rely on the OS's au-
thentication mechanisms for the purpose of access control to the browser application 
itself. However, the browser can use IPsec (part of the OS and IP based authentication) 
or its own authentication functionality for the purpose of authenticating servers with 
which it communicates (see Section 4.3). 
To maintain a browser in a secure state, there must be a reliable environment pro-
viding necessary security measures to the browser and the browser itself must use 
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security mechanisms in all areas of its operations. Accordingly, a detailed list of the 
assumptions of browser functionality and the surrounding environment is produced 
and the list can be found in Appendix A - Section A.3 .1. They are summarised below: 
• Access: All access to the browser and its data is controlled by the Operating 
System (including audit data). 
• Storage: The Operating System provides secure storage for the browser itself 
and its data (including audit data). 
• Authentication: The Operating System will authenticate a user prior to granting 
access to the browser. 
• Identification: The Operating System provides the browser with all required user 
identification information. 
• Malicious file: Downloaded files are checked by the Operating System to deter-
mine if they contain malicious data. 
• Administrator: System administrators manage the browser and the information 
it contains, and can be trusted not to abuse their privileges. 
• Server: The servers, with which the browser interacts, are regarded as trustwor-
thy, especially for conveying and maintaining the correct file type, maintaining 
confidentiality and integrity of the file content. 
• Operating system: The Operating System securely controls all information ex-
change with the browser. 
Donaldson [ 18] states that assumptions should include intended usage aspects, con-
nectivity aspects, personnel aspects, and environmental protection aspects. In practice, 
it seems virtually impossible to list all the assumptions in the first attempt. Hence, 
the listing of assumptions has been reviewed throughout the development of the SRP, 
and extended with additional assumptions. This happens especially when the rationale 
section is constructed. (The rationale contains arguments detailing how the security 
objectives encounter the identified threats.) 
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4.2.2 Threats to Security 
Threats to a particular computer product should be identified through the normal "Risk 
Analysis" process [18]. The CC does not provide a framework for risk analysis and it 
is up to the author of the profile to decide how the threats are identified. However, the 
CC does provide the general principles involved in identifying threats; and they were 
employed in the development of this SRP. 
In Chapter 2, threats for browsers have been identified under three areas: con-
nection threats, threats to data, and threats to the host. Here the threats discussed in 
Chapter 2 are reiterated for the purpose of defining the SRP. 
Following the CC, a threat, or undesirable event, has three components: an asset, a 
threat agent, and a method. 
Asset: Information or resources to be protected by the countermeasures of the browser. 
The assets are not only of value to the owner but also potentially to the threat 
agents who seek to compromise the browser. 
Agent: Either human or software application, their activities violate the security level 
of the assets. 
Method: Possible attack methods in relation to potential vulnerability of the assets 
and capabilities of the attacker. 
Table 4.1 represents the threat agents, methods of attack, assets, and the result of 
their interrelation. The threats outlined in the table are mainly caused by human users, 
either authorised users (normal users or privileged users i.e administrators) or intrud-
ers. Unauthorised users can access a browser and change a browser's configuration in 
order to download a file of illicit file type. If this unauthorised access occurs during 
data transmission then inaccurate data could be transferred. Even if browsers operate 
securely, it is possible to download inaccurate data if the connected server is spoofed 
or untrustworthy and a file's contept and/or file type are changed. Authorised users, in-
cluding normal users and administrators, would intentionally or unintentionally change 
the browser's configuration and this may allow users downloading a file with an illicit 
file type. Recognising that errors are always possible, it is accepted that both normal 
users and administrators may commit errors during 'their interaction with the browser. 
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Asset Threat Agent Method Consequence effects 
Data Unauthorised Unauthorised - loss of C (disclosure of the data) 
(C, I) users access -loss ofi (modification of the data) 
- Compromise browser security 
(download a file with illicit type) 
Data Authorised Unintentiona - Compromise browser security 
(I) users activity (download a file with illicit type) 
Data Authorised Intentional - Compromise browser security 
(I) users activity (download a file with illicit type) 
Data Software Undiscovere< -Compromise browser security 
(C and I) flaw (download a file with illicit type) 
System Hardware Failure -loss of A 
(A) (e.g., power (interruption in downloading) 
supply) 
Table 4.1: Interrelation betWeen assets, threat agents, methods, and effects. 
(C =Confidentiality, I= Integrity, A= Availability) 
Additionally, the browser can be implemented with undiscovered flaws which may 
allow users to compromise security by actions, such as downloading files with unper-
mitted file type. Thus, flaws in software (the OS and browser itself) can compromise 
security of the browser which in turn allows users to download disallowed file types. 
Threats defined in the SRP are included in Appendix A Section A.3 .2. 
4.2.3 Organisational Security Policies 
According to the CC, any relevant organisational security policy is required to be in-
cluded so that security objectives can be clearly identified [46]. However, the CC 
allows the statement of policies to be omitted if the security objectives are derived en-
tirely from the threats [ 18] and this is the case in this work. It is necessary to note 
that any security issues exposed under the threats section should not be included as a 
policy, because it will simply be a restatement of a threat. There are certain circum-
stances where profile authors must specify policies, for example if the browser will be 
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used by a specific type of organisation. A good example that cannot be a threat is "an 
organization's security policy in regard to security audit" [18]. 
With regard to the security in browsers, there is only one requirement of the organisa-
tional policy. That is: "Users shall be held accountable for their actions". By having 
such a requirement, the users can not perform any illicit action without it having been 
recorded along with their identity. 
4.3 Security Objectives 
In Section 4.2, the security environment was discussed in terms of assumptions, threats, 
and policies. Security objectives can be effectively identified by addressing these as-
sumptions, threats, and policies [ 46]. 
Security objectives represent the security goals that the users desire the browser 
to achieve. These objectives are grouped based on their affiliations with either the 
browser itself or the browser environment. Section A.4 in Appendix A shows security 
objectives for the SRP. 
4.3.1 Security Objectives for Browsers 
Traditionally, IT security is concerned with confidentiality, integrity, and availability 
[9]. With browsers, availability is omitted, as it is not a major issue in the circumstance 
where the. browser operates and access to a browser is controlled by the OS. However, 
integrity is a high priority since the browser must accurately obtain data from remote 
servers. Another high priority is confidentiality which may be required by some or-
ganisations (e.g., government, bank, etc) but not all users ofthe browser. Servers also 
need to authenticate browser for the purpose of access control. 
Five objectives are identified in the SRP and their intentions are as follows: 
1. Authentication. The means for providing an authentication mechanism to verify 
the identity ofbrowserusers by servers and vice versa. User and server authenti-
cation are required in establishing a secure com1ection between a browser (user) 
and a server. 
2. Confidentiality. The means for ensuring that data or files can not be illegitimately 
obtained during transmission. Confidentiality is important because browsers 
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carry sensitive data (e.g., financial data, personal information, or national se-
curity information). 
3. Integrity. The means for ensuring the integrity of downloaded files and data is 
maintained during transmission. Integrity is wanted because accurate data is as 
imperative as confidentiality in downloaded data. 
4. Access rest1iction. The means for limiting access to the browser and download-
ing only permitted file types. This is to stop downloading dangerous file types 
(e.g., executable) in a proactive approach. Limitations are imposed by the ad-
ministrator who can also override those of normal users. 
5. Audit. The means for recording security relevant events to hold individual users 
accountable for the actions they perform. This objective aims to log security 
relevant events providing user accountability. 
4.3.2 Security Objectives for the Environment 
Without an appropriately secured environment it would not be possible for the browser 
to achieve its security aims. The browser environment includes not only interacting IT 
products or systems but also the human users working with the browser. Specifically, 
they are the underlying operating system, users and administrators, the connecting 
server, security on the browser installation and maintenance, and services that provide 
other necessary mechanisms for the browser operation. The following summarises the 
security objectives for the browser environment. 
1. Operating system. The operating system should itselfhave an appropriate secu-
rity level and provide security relevant information to the browser, for example 
access to browser data, secure storage for browser data, authenticating users be-
fore granting access to the browser, providing user identity information to the 
browser, and checking downloaded data for malicious data. 
2. Trained administrators. Administrators must be adequately trained to manage 
and operate the browser. 
3. Servers. Servers must be trustworthy. 
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4. Browser operation. The browser is designed, installed, implemented, config-
ured, managed, and operated in a secure manner. 
4.4 IT Security Requirements 
The security requirements define "security needs" that the browser has to address. The 
IT security requirements are described in terms of the security functional requirements 
(SFRs) for browsers, security assurance requirements (SARs) for the browsers, and se-
curity requirements for the IT environment. The CC defines SFRs as the requirements 
for security functions provided by the TOE in order to achieve security objectives for · 
the TOE. Examples of security functional requirements are requirements for authen-
tication, access control mechanism, and security audit. The CC describes SARs as a 
specification of a strength level of the SFR that is consistent with the defined security 
objectives. For example, if the security function is a secure authentication mechanism 
using password, a SAR may specify that the minimum length of the password is co her-
ent with the identified security objective for authentication. The security requirements 
in the SRP are defined using the catalogue of functional and assurance components 
detailed in the standard ISO!IEC 15408 Part-2 and Part-3, respectively [46]. 
4.4.1 Security Functional Requirements 
The security objectives identified in Section 4.3 must be met by the security functional 
requirements and this can be achieved by selecting them appropriately from the list 
defined by the CC. If a requirement needed for a particular profile is not in the CC 
defined list, then the PP's authors can write the requirement to be included in the PP 
(but they must follow the CC's defined taxonomy). There are two types of security 
functional requirement in the CC: 
• Principle security functional requirement - directly satisfy the objectives 
• Supporting security functional requirement- indirectly satisfy the objectives 
There are several stages involved in selecting SFRs. Some stages are necessarily 
iterative but overall this makes the process both complete and efficient. In the first 
stage, each objective must be addressed by one or more principle SFRs. At the second 
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stage, the process is iterated in order to select supporting SFRs that will provide more 
security functional components to the objectives. 
The SRP is completed successfully with the security functional requirement com-
ponents extracted from the CC. 
The security functional requirements identified by this work to cover the browser 
security objectives are listed in Table 4.2 and these SFRs are described using the CC's 
methodology in Section A.5 .1 of Appendix A. In order to choose the appropriate SFRs 
for each security objective, a major function to encounter the objective was identified 
first, and then suitable SFRs were searched in the SFR catalogue of the CC. For exam-
ple, the audit recording was identified as a major function for the O.AUDIT objective, 
since it requires the TOE to provide the means for recording security relevant. The 
research then selected the SFR components such as FAU_GEN.l to generate an audit 
record providing the required audit information, FAU_GEN.2 to link audit events and 
the users who cause the events, and FPT _STM.l to obtain an accurate time for each 
security event. The security functional requirement components and their supported 
functions are summarised below. 
Class Functional Component 
Security audit Audit data generation 
User identity association 
Reliable time stamps 
User data protection Subset information flow control 
Simple security attributes 
Identification and Authentica- User identification before any action 
tion 
Trusted path/channels Trusted channel 
Table 4.2: The Security functional Requirements and their components 
1. Security audit. Audit data generation defines the auditable events and generates 
an audit record providing the required audit information. In the record, user 
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identity is used to link audit events and the users who cause the event. Reliable 
time stamps then provide an accurate time that is recorded along with each audit 
event. The reliable time is critical for audit records as they assist administrators 
to detect the sequence or/and pattern of the security related events. By having 
such reliable audit records including associated users, administrators are able to 
detect the misuse or unauthorised activity of the users. 
2. User data protection. Information flow control ensures that all user requests are 
subject to the identified security policy for file downloading. This policy allows 
users to download files with file type permitted by the administrator. Security 
attributes support the information flow control by restricting all users to the rules 
outlined in the SFR with regards to user identity, the file type and whether a 
secure connection for communicating the file is required. In short, the security 
attributes and rules for the information flow ensure that the file transmissions 
take place in accordance with the defined organisational secUrity policies. 
3. Identification and Authentication. User identification before any action ensures 
that users are identified before any other action is taken by the browser. Even 
though it is assumed that users are identified by the OS before they use browser, 
this requirement is necessary to include in SFRs because user identities are used 
in the secure audit SFR to associate user identities with the security events. 
4. Trusted path/channels. A trusted channel provides a communication channel 
separated from other channels and assures the identification of connecting servers, 
while a trusted path between the browser and the user ensures that communica-
tion between them is protected from modification by or disclosure to untrusted 
applications. Using the trusted path/channels, the browser can securely identi-
fiy user and also authenticate a server, thus a level of trust is built for the data 
downloaded from that server. 
4.5 Security Assurance Requirements 
The SARs describe how well the security functions are implemented in the browser (as 
compared to the security functional requirements which describe the security functions 
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the browser must provide). The selection of the SARs involves considering several 
factors. The major considerations are: 
• The value of the assets. The greater the value of the assets, the higher the level 
of evaluation and thus the higher level of assurance is required. 
• Technical feasibility. It must be practical to achieve specific assurance compo-
nents. 
• Costs and time for development and evaluation. The cost and time should be 
reasonable. 
The security objectives also impact on the security assurance requirements needed 
for the browser. For example, if an objective states that the browser should be resis-
tant to the attackers, then the security assurance requirements must have a component 
requiring such resistance to be demonstrated. Another example would be ifthe organ-
isational policies determine the level of assurance of the browser to be used for their 
business, then the profile must have security assurance requirements in that assurance 
level. However, this policy determination can't be taken into account for the SRP as it 
has been developed with no intention to use in a specific type of business. 
In general, the SARs catalogue starts from Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) 1 to 
7. The PP authors can select a desired EAL level from the predefined EAL list. The CC 
claims that the greater assurance is obtained from the greater evaluation effort. Thus, 
the goal is to apply the minium evaluation effort for the necessary level of assurance. 
The evaluation effort increases along with the portion of the IT product, the finer level 
of the design and implementation, and the structured formal manner. Therefore, there 
is a significant barrier to achieving higher assurance levels. 
This SRP has been developed for circumstances where a moderate level of security 
is required. Thus for the security requirements profile, Evaluation Assurance Level 3 
(EAL3) has been selected as that level includes high level design and configuration 
management control, testing for all parts of the browser, and documentation of the 
browser. The assurance classes and their assurance components included in the EAL3 
(as described in the CC) are listed in Table 4.3 [ 46]. More information for SARs can 
be found in Section A.5.2 in Appendix A. 
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Assurance Class Assurance Components 
Configuration Management Authorisation controls 
Browser CM coverage 
Delivery and Operation Delivery procedures 
Installation, generation, and start-up procedures 
Development Informal functional specification 
Security enforcing high-level design 
Informal correspondence demonstration 
Guidance Documents Administrator guidance 
User guidance 
Life Cycle Support Identification of security measures 
Tests Analysis of coverage 
Testing: high-level design 
Functional testing 
Independent testing - sample 
Vulnerability Assessment Examination of guidance 
Strength of browser security function evaluation 
Developer vulnerability analysis 
Table 4.3: Security Assurance Requirements for EAL3 
4.5.1 Security Requirements on the Environment 
The requirements for the browser's environment are necessary for various reasons. One 
reason is because the browser will entirely depend on the underlying operating system 
or hardware devices for security operation in some way. Thus the requirements for 
that associated software and hardware should be addressed under this section. The CC 
states that the components in its Part 2 may not be appropriate to express the security· 
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requirements for the environment. In this case, authors are allowed to compose their 
own components but they must provide justification for any deviation from the CC 
components. 
The assurance in any security requirements provided by the IT environment must 
be the same or above to the security requirements provided by the TOE. For example, 
EAL3 set for an access control functionality would be undermined if the identification 
and authentication functionality provided by the OS is EAL2. Since EAL3 is chosen 
for browsers, the assurance requirement for IT environment is to be assured to EAL3. 
This profile does not need any new security requirement components and this sec-
tion in the profile was successfully completed by using the components of the CC 
catalogue. 
The following requirements are selected as they are needed by the browser but are 
performed by the OS with which the browser interacts. It is necessary that the OS 
manages all of the configuration files and access to those files securely as the browser 
security depends upon this. The following subsections outline the security requirement 
components required for the browser SRP. 
4.5.1.1 Identification and Authentication 
Identification and authentication ensures that users are not allowed to perform any ac-
tions before they are successfully identified by the underlying OS. Thus only legitimate 
users identified by the OS can access the browser. 
4.5.1.2 Security Management 
Management of security attributes enforces a security policy that restricts access to 
the security attributes of the configuration files to authorised users. Security attribute 
initialisation is therefore required to enforce the security policy to provide either initial 
values or default values (if no initial values) for the browser and its associated files. 
Additionally, security roles need to be maintained (i.e., administrator, users) and users 
must be associated with the roles. In summary, setting a security attribute (at least) to 
the configuration file (and that can only be changed by a user with an appropriate role) 
contributes to the security of the browsers. 
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4.6 Rationale 
The rationale section contains arguments demonstrating that the profile is complete, 
consistent and reasonable. It is achieved by verifying that the browser has provided 
effective security measures within its security environment [18][ 46]. Furthermore, the 
rationale corroborates that the security functional requirements and assurance require-
ments in the profile meet the security objectives and covers all aspects of the security 
environment. The rationale is briefly discussed in the following three subsections but 
the comprehensive discussion is given in Section A.6. 
4.6.1 Security Objectives Rationale 
Security objectives have been identified with regard to security environment defined 
in terms of assumptions, threats, and organisational policies. If it is possible to show 
that the objectives have covered all security needs as specified in security environment, 
then the security objectives rationale has been well achieved. In the SRP, all security 
environmental factors identified are addressed along with associated objectives (see 
Table A.4 and A.S). Thus it proves that the SRP is complete and consistent. 
4.6.2 Security Requirements Rationale 
The research has demonstrated that the selected security requirements are sufficient 
and necessary to meet the security objectives identified (see Table A.6 and A. 7). Hence, 
it is appropriate to say that the SRP is complete and consistent. Take note again that 
one security objective can be countered by a number of security requirements and vice 
versa. 
4.6.3 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale 
This rationale explains the reason for the chosen assurance package EAL3 for this Pro-
file. The major considerations are that the browser requires a moderate security level 
and that EAL3 is deemed achievable. As discussed in Section 4.5 .1, EAL3 set for an 
access control functionality would be undermined if the identification and authentica-
tion functionality provided by the OS is EAL2. Thus, the underlying operating system 
must also have a EAL level at least that of the browser. 
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In summary, the underlying operating system shall need to have the EAL3 as the 
browser relies on the operating system for numerous important functions such as user 
authentication, access control, etc. 
4. 7 Overview of the Web Browser Protection Profile 
The work on the security requirement profile (SRP) was started in the middle of 2000 
and completed the SRP in March 2001. "A Web Browser Protection Profile (WBPP)" 
developed by U.S. government and industry become publicly available in early May 
2001 [24]. Therefore the SRP's authors were not aware that there was a profile being 
developed for browsers at the time the research was started. However, the U.S gov-
ernment's work on a PP for web browsers demonstrates that browser security is an 
important issue. Thus, here a brief discussion of the WBPP is given, and similarities 
and differences between the WBPP and the SRP are identified. 
As the WBPP is developed for the U.S. government, the description of the browsers 
given in the PP emphasises that a browser must be a "A PKl-enabled secure web 
browser compliant with the Global Information Grid (GIG) policy IA6-651 0 and the 
Information Assurance Technical Framework (IATF) Forum documentation while com-
municating through the Hyper-Text Transfer Protocol- Secure (HTTPS) ... The browser 
may support the execution of mobile code (e.g., JavaScript or ActiveX) in an isolated 
secure manner". 
In this section, some key components of the WBPP are briefly discussed. They 
are: security environment for browsers, security objectives for the TOE and its envi-
ronment, security functional requirements, and security assurance requirements. The 
comparison of the WBPP and the SRP is then discussed in detail. 
4.7.1 Security Environment for Browsers 
The security usage assumptions in the WBPP describe security aspects of the environ-
ment which includes personnel, physical, and connectivity aspects. The assumptions 
made in the PP are: administrators follow guidance for the configuration and mainte-
nance of the TOE; users utilise information for intended purposes; network connec-
tions are secured; data is non-malicious; plug-ins are not part of the TOE; certificates 
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determine the role permissions; and time synchronisation with the OS. 
For threats, the WBPP is concerned with human users, downloaded data, and 
browser functions. The threats corning from human users include errors made by ad-
ministrators, user data viewed by other users, browser information obtained by unau-
thorised users, and unauthorised functions performed by users. Threats in downloaded 
data include malicious code and active content operations, and downloaded data ac-
cessing system files. The browser can also unintentionally or intentionally misrepre-
sent security relevant information. 
The PP then imposes seven policies which aim to protect browsers' sensitive data. 
The policies address user accountability, information accessibility and availability, 
guidance for installation and usage, data integrity, user training, and physical access 
control. 
4.7.2 Security Objectives 
The PP defines a list of security objectives for the TOE in order to counter identified 
threats and/or comply with any organisational security policies identified. The security 
objectives are identified in the following sections. 
4.7.2.1 Security Objectives for the TOE 
The WBPP includes a number of objectives that address security issues in relation to 
browser users and their data, the downloaded data, secure sessions, and the connecting 
servers. Objectives regarding browser users and their data include restricting users' 
actions prior to being authenticated, maintaining security-relevant roles and the asso-
ciation of users with those roles, maintaining the user attributes for each active session, 
providing evidence by users for identification and authentication processes to support 
accountability by the destination servers, and separating user data (e.g., history, pro-
files, cookies, and cache) from other user data. Objectives which aim to address the 
downloaded data include controlling active content downloaded from a web server, and 
displaying and labelling the inforn1ation according to its content as received from the 
destination server. Objectives identified for secure sessions are recovering browser au-
tomatically to a consistent and secure state, and terminating an inactive secure session. 
For servers, one objective is defined and this is validating the connected destination 
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server. 
4.7.2.2 IT Security Objectives for the TOE Environment 
In this section, the WBPP identifies three objectives: defining the necessary settings 
for each cryptographic operation to establish and maintain a secure state of the TOE; 
using appropriate cryptographic services in order to authenticate the browser user to 
the server; and operating with other network devices to protect transmitted data. 
4.7.2.3 Non-IT Security Objectives for the TOE Environment 
Non-IT security objectives for the TOE Environment in the WBPP are: training autho-
rised administrators for the establishment and maintenance of sound security policies 
and practices; procedures for browser delivery, installation, and managing in order to 
maintain the system security; and the protection of computing resources and conflict 
resolution in a multitasking environment. 
4.7.3 Security Functional Requirements 
Based on the security objectives, the PP selected four classes of security functional 
requirements: Cryptographic Support, User Data Protection, Identification and Au-
thentication, and Security Management. 
4. 7.4 Security Assurance Requirements 
The profile has chosen EAL2 for security assurance requirements and EAL2 is defined 
by the CC as "structurally tested". 
4. 7.5 Comparison of the WBPP and the SRP 
The TOE description in both profiles is very similar. However, the rest of each profile 
has a number of differences to the other and they are discussed in this section. 
For the security usage assumptions in the security environment section, the SRP 
claims that browsers rely on the OS in tem1s of access control for browsers and their 
data, user identification, and user authentication. However, the WBPP did not contain 
an assumption with regard to access control, identification, and authentication to be 
provided by the OS. The SRP addresses some assumptions made by the WBPP in other 
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sections of the SRP, for example the assumption "the TOE will rely on the operating 
system for the purpose of a timekeeping mechanism" is addressed by security audit 
class in security functional requirements. 
Both profiles identifY threats very closely except for "the alteration of file type" 
addressed by the SRP and "misrepresenting security relevant information" raised by 
the WBPP. The SRP's concern of file type alteration is covered by an assumption in 
WBPP. The assumption in WBPP presumes the protocols used for network connections 
protect information (by physical protection and encryption (ssl)) from disclosure and 
modification during transmission. An example for misrepresenting security relevant 
information, as described by the WBPP, is that a browser displays a padlock as if SSL 
is enabled but no actual SSL takes place, and this tricks users into sending sensitive 
data in clear form. As discussed in Section 2.3 .1, this is caused by administrators 
and browser implementers who lack good implementation practices and knowledge of 
cryptography. Thus SSL is an adequate secure connection protocol if it is configured 
properly and is used in conjunction with a secure operating system. For this reason, 
the SRP's authors do not identifY this threat in the SRP. 
For Policy, both profiles include a policy for user accountability while the WBPP 
identified six more policies aiming to protect browsers' sensitive data. Unlike the 
WBPP, the SRP does not identifY policies for information availability, information 
accessibility, training users to use the browser properly, establishing guidance for in-
stallation and use of the browser, retaining integrity of the browser information, and 
controlling physical access to the host system. The reason for not having these policies 
is that these issues have been addressed elsewhere within the SRP. Unlike the WBPP, 
the SRP does not identifY policies for information availability, information accessibil-
ity, training users to use the browser properly, establishing guidance for installation 
and use of the browser, retaining integrity of the browser information, and control-
ling physical access to the host system. The reason for not having these policies is 
that these issues have been fully or partially addressed elsewhere within the SRP. The 
policies for information availability, accessibility, retaining integrity of the browser in-
fom1ation are addressed by an assumption for access to a browser and its data, which 
assumes that all access to a browser and its data is controlled by the OS. The policy for 
guidelines is covered by a threat, which notes that administrators may commit errors in 
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installation, configuration, or management of the TOE, compromising security. While 
the policies for physical controls and training users are not explicitly addressed in the 
SRP, they are partially covered by security requirements for environment, operating 
and training, respectively. 
Security objectives for the TOE in both profiles are very similar but each has extra 
objectives that are not in the other. The SRP defines an extra objective for recording 
audit data. The WBPP includes additional objectives for limiting access of active con-
tent, recovering the browser to secure state, and terminating an inactive session. The 
objective for limiting access of active content is not addressed in the SRP, but the SRP 
contains objective for restricting file type which will not allow downloading malicious 
data. Despite the different definitions of these security objectives listed in the SRP 
and the WBPP, the same SFRs are chosen to meet these objectives. The SRP does not 
define objectives for recovering the browser to secure state and terminating an inactive 
session, because even though these objectives aim for a good security practice, they 
do little to improve security of the browser and its data as these functions are already 
supported by the underlying OS. 
Security objectives for environment in both profiles have focussed on different is-
sues. The SRP requires the OS to have an appropriate security level (since it support 
user identification and authentication, and access control mechanism), but it is not ad-
dressed by the WBPP even though it is crucial for browser security. The SRP also 
requires the browser to be designed, installed, maintained, and operated in a secure 
manner, and that are listed in non-IT security objective for environment in the WBPP. 
The SRP defines the browser to have a mechanism for user accountability while WBPP 
addresses this as objective for TOE. Training for the browser administrators is ad-
dressed in the environment section by the SRP, but the WBPP prefers to place it in the 
policy section. Thus it appears that the WBPP considers this requirement is critical 
and must be enforced at organisational level (SRP simple expects this objective from 
the TOE environment). The SRP requires the browser to interact with trustworthy 
servers, but the WBPP does not have any objective for this issue. The WBPP identified 
objectives for environment in relation to the cryptographic mechanism and network 
services, which are covered by the SRP under the objective for designing, installation, 
and maintaining of the browser. 
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For non-IT security objectives, the SRP defined none and the WBPP has four ob-
jectives which are however addressed in the SRP under security objectives for environ-
ment. 
In security functional requirements section, both profiles choose user data protec-
tion, identification and authentication classes, protection of the TOE security functions, 
and trusted path/channels. The additional class in the SRP is security audit. Because 
the WBPP is completed without identifying secure audit, it seems that the underlying 
OS is providing it. The WBPP also has some additional classes such as cryptographic 
operation class, which is considered by the SRP as part of the trusted path/channels 
(the TLS function), and security management class which is included in security re-
quirements for the IT environment section in the SRP. 
The Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) selected for the SRP and the WBPP are dif-
ferent, as the SRP has chosen EAL3 and the WBPP has selected EAL2. The CC part 3 
explained that "EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users 
require a moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough in-
vestigation of the TOE and its development without substantial re-engineering. EAL2 
permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security 
engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound devel-
opment practices". The SRP's authors believe that EAL3 is achievable as it requires a 
moderate level of assured security, and that a thorough investigation of the browser and 
its development can be obtained by people with general computer security knowledge. 
As a summary, both profiles have been developed with similar security concerns. 
The major differences between them are the SRP raises the auditing security issue 
while the WBPP discusses about the security issue on active content which is covered 
by file type restriction in the SRP, and the inactive secure session which, the SRP's 
authors assume, has little impact on the browser security. 
4.8 Summary 
This chapter has described the considerations undertaken over the period of develop-
ment of the SRP. The SRP has entirely focused on security in file downloading in 
terms of confidentiality and integrity. The Profile has five objectives addressing au-
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dit trial, access restriction, authentication, confidentiality, and integrity. The rationale 
section demonstrates that the chosen security components from the CC comply with 
the identified objectives. It is worthwhile to reiterate that the underlying operating 
system shall have an equivalent or higher security level (Security Assurance Require-
ments level in the CC's terminology) with the right SFRs to support browsers, since the 
browsers make use of its identification and authentication mechanism, access control 
to the browser itself, and its data in storage or transit between two applications (e.g., 
browser and email application). The complete SRP has been included as Appendix A. 
A comparison of the SRP with the more recently released "Web Browser Protection 
Profile" [24] was performed. 
In the next chapter, this SRP is used to assess current browsers and to determine if 
they have the security requirements identified in here. 
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Chapter 5 
Assessment of Current Browsers 
In Chapter 2, browser security in terms of the services they provide was highlighted. 
The SRP for browsers was then composed in Chapter 4 to address security problems 
identified in Chapter 2. This chapter contains a discussion on how much security 
today 's browsers are providing by checking against the security requirements identified 
in the SRP for browsers. 
Chapter 2 addressed browser security problems in three components: connection, 
downloaded data, and host security. These three aspects affect each other if security 
in one area fails. For example, if connection security is compromised by an attack, 
then data can be modified during transmission. Thus downloaded data security fails 
and consequently host security is affected by the compromised downloaded data, for 
example if there is a virus in the file. Therefore it is important that security is deployed 
in all components of browsers. Since browsers initialise a new connection to servers 
and send the servers requests for files to be transferred, the research examines the file 
transferring protocols used by browsers. The analysis of HTTP over TLS, the principal 
file transferring protocol used on the web, has been included in this chapter while 
the findings for some file transferring protocols such as File Transfer Protocol (FTP), 
Secure Copy (SCP) over Secure Shell protocol (SSH), and File Transfer, Access, and 
Management protocol (FTAM) are included in Appendix B. 
The SRP outlined the security objectives for browsers such as authentication, con-
fidentiality, integrity, access restriction, and audit, as developed in Chapter 4. The SRP 
consequently identified security requirements in order to achieve the security objec-
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tives outlined. These security requirements are: 
• Identification and authentication: users are identified before any other action is 
performed by the browser. 
• Trusted path/channels: browsers use a communication path between themselves 
and a server that is logically separate from other communication paths to ensures 
the identification of connecting servers, and to protect the transmitted data from 
alteration or disclosure. 
• User data protection: restricting all users to the rules outlined in the organi-
sational policy with regards to user identity, the file type and whether a secure 
connection for communicating the file is required. 
• Security audit: to record security relevant events to hold individual users ac-
countable for the actions they have performed. 
The SRP is then used in evaluating modern browsers in order to see if they have 
sufficient security measures suitable for downloading sensitive data. For evaluation 
purposes, the research have chosen Netscape and Internet Explorer as they are the 
most popular commercial browsers, Opera for its reputation for speed and less resource 
usage, and the Lynx text browser for its recognised simplicity. Since browsers make 
use of user identity and access control provided by the OSs, the research also selected 
two current major operating systems, Windows 2000 and RedHat Linux version 7.3, 
for evaluation with respect to these two features. 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.1 discusses the requirements of the 
OS in supporting security in browsers. Since browsers operate on top of the underly-
ing OS, this section ensures that the evaluated OSs have adequate security measures 
to support browsers. The following section, Section 5 .2; analyses security features in 
connection protocols used by browsers, e.g., HTTP and HTTP/TLS. Section 5.3 then 
explains how auditing is implemented in current browsers and what they still have to 
improve for obtaining audit data as required by the SRP. In Section 5.4, the issue of 
restricting file access is discussed in terms of users downloading files with administra-
tors permitted file type and users accessing downloaded files with correct permissions. 
Finally, the conclusion in Section 5.5 summarises the evaluation. 
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5.1 Operating System Responsibilities 
As mentioned in Chapter 4 (Section 4.2), the underlying OS is responsible for user 
identification, authentication, and access control. Section 4.2 continued to explain 
the reasons for relying on the OS for these requirements. In short, browsers make 
use of the OS 's identification, authentication, and access control mechanisms for two 
reasons. Firstly, they are major tasks of the OSs, and secondly if the OSs fail to stop 
an intruder, there is no way for a browser to protect itself at all. In fact, as explained 
in Section 4.5 that the operating system must have the same security level or higher 
as the browsers, since the overall security level of a browser is the minimum security 
level of any cooperating application which includes the operating system. 
The OS can provide browsers with user ID, time, and secure storage. Modem 
operating systems allow programmers to use system API calls such as "getuid", "time", 
and "open" to create a file. Even though the research does not recommend identifying 
and authenticating users again after they log in, a secure browser needs to utilise these 
system calls for creating audit data. In Chapter 6, how a prototype for a secure browser 
uses the system calls to generate audit data is discussed. 
The research identifies the extent ofuser identification, authentication, and access 
control mechanisms (part of user data protection) used by the current major OSs. The 
findings are outlined in the following sections. 
5.1.1 User Identification and Authentication 
The research analysed how user identification and authentication is performed in the 
selected OSs, namely Windows 2000 for the Windows platform and RedHat Linux 
7.3 for the UNIX platform. In general, both OSs prompt users to supply account in-
formation (user name and password) in the first stage of logon, then the OSs verify 
the account information and provide access to the computer if the information is cor-
rect. Windows 2000 provides local authentication by using local account information, 
and so does Linux 7.3 by using passwords stored in the /etc/passwd file. They also 
provide central authentication mechanisms such as Kerberos1 in Windows 2000, and 
1 An Internet standard security protocol for handling authentication of user or system identity. With 
Kerberos V5, passwords that are sent across network lines are encrypted. Kerberos VS includes other 
security features, e.g., Key Distribution Centre (KDC) service that issues Ticket-granting ticket (TGT) 
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NIS+2 and Sesame3 in RedHat Linux 7.3. In short, both Windows 2000 and RedHat 
Linux provide a number of industry-standard authentication mechanisms, including 
user name and password, smart cards, single sign-on secure authentication (Kerberos, 
Sesame), and biometric authentication mechanisms. 
Regardless of the method used to verify user identity, Windows 2000 consistently 
uses Active Directory to look up the identity presented by the authentication mech-
anism. If authentication is successful and an account is found for the user, Windows 
2000 provides the user with a set of credentials that can be used throughout the network 
to access resources. On the other hand, RedHat Linux uses Pluggable Authentication 
Modules (PAM), which allows the system administrator to authenticate users by using 
PAM-aware applications without having to recompile authentication programs. 
In summary, the two major OSs, Windows and Unix offer many user identifica-
tion and authentication mechanisms to choose from. For example users can deploy a 
simple password authentication or more sophisticated mechanisms such as biometric 
authentication. 
5.1.2 Access Control Mechanism 
Generally, OS access control is performed by granting access attributes to owner, 
group, or everyone. The granted access attributes are stored in the Access Control 
Lists (ACLs) which are read by the OS to determine whether to allow or deny access 
to a file or a directory. ACLs are also used when a process (started as soon as a user 
runs a program) tries to access some system resources. The decision on whether to al-
low or deny access to the system is made based on the privilege of the user who starts 
the program, for example a program run by a normal user cannot access a password 
file but the program run by administrators can. 
In Windows 2000 and RedHat Linux 7.3, if the same attributes are required by 
many users, administrators can put the users into a group and then grant it with access 
attributes. With both OSs, a user can be a member of multiple groups. 
in order to obtain Ticket-granting service (TGS) tickets that allow users to authenticate to services in a 
domain [31]. 
2NIS+ is a database containing users account information and related authentication data [41]. 
3 SESAME technology offers sophisticated single sign-on with added distributed access control fea-
tures and cryptographic protection of interchanged data [52]. 
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Windows 2000 offers five levels of permission - Full control, Modify, Read, Read 
and Execute, and Write - to be assigned on files and directories. Windows 2000 also 
allows administrators to assign different permissions to different users and groups for 
a particular file. For example, administrators can allow one user to read the contents of 
a file, allow another user to make changes to the file, and prevent all other users from 
accessing the file. Hence, Windows 2000 provides a simple, efficient way to set up and 
maintain security on browsers and their related data by assigning only the necessary 
access attributes to the browsers and the related file for an individual user or a group. 
With RedHat Linux 7.3, the access control mechanism is simple because it defines 
only three access attributes - read, write, execute - for three types of account such 
as the owner of a file or a directory, groups, and everyone. Thus, by default RedHat 
Linux 7.3 supports ACLs with less granularity than Windows 2000. However, there 
exist ACLs utilities called "setfacl" for RedHat Linux 7.3 with functionality similar to 
that of Windows 2000 [23]. 
Even though RedHat Linux 7.3 has only three access attributes (read, write, ex-
ecute), it has similar functions to the other access attributes of Windows 2000. For 
example, "Delete" in Windows 2000 is part of"Write" attributes in RedHat Linux, and 
the same functions of "Change permission" and "Take ownership" in Windows 2000 
are done in RedHat Linux by using "chmod" and "chown" commands respectively. 
For directories, RedHat Linux's "Write" attribute carries the same effect as "Add" in 
Windows 2000 and "Is" command in RedHat Linux produces the same result as in 
"List" attribute in Windows 2000. 
Table 5.1 shows access functions and the names of access attributes in RedHat 
Linux 7.3 and Windows 2000. 
The major concern with access control mechanisms comes from the fact that the 
downloaded data, audit files, and the browsers themselves are protected by these access 
attributes (permissions) from unauthorised access. If an audit file, for example, is 
inadvertently set writable to everyone, then the content of the file could be edited by 
any user and consequently administrators cannot trace how a security problem (e.g., 
changes in the browser's configuration file) has occmred. 
As a conclusion, Windows 2000 can provide finer-grained access control lists but 
RedHat Linux 7.3 requires an additional ACLs utility in order to support similar fine-
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grained ACLs. 
Access Functions RedHat Linux Windows 2000 
Read access Read (r) Read 
Write access Write (w) Write 
Executable Execute (x) Execute 
Delete Write (w) Delete 
Change permission Owner only Change permission 
Take ownership - Take ownership 
Full control Read Write Execute (rwx) Full control 
Add (for directory) Write (w) Add 
List (for directory) Execute (x) list 
Table 5.1: Access type comparisons in UNIX and Windows operating system 
5.2 Connection Security 
Browsers can use either HTTP by itself or HTTP over TLS to setup a connection with 
servers. However, there are many weak points in HTTP alone. For example, HTTP 
supports user authentication but cannot authenticate servers since they can only check 
the IP address and this can be modified by an attack on servers or during transmission. 
HTTP also transfers data in clear text, hence it can be monitored by attackers without 
being detected. 
In the light of weaknesses in HTTP, the SRP enforces the use of HTTP over TLS 
to gain authentication between browsers and servers, and to give downloaded data 
confidentiality and integrity. The research found that all the evaluated browsers support 
TLS. 
Since TLS uses certificates for peer authentication and to provide a mechanism 
to achieve data confidentiality, the research investigates browsers further for how and 
what kinds of certificates are provided. Generally, they all have a built-in database, 
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which contains many certificates of Certificate Authorities (CA) used by browser to 
validate server certificates which are signed by a CA. The browser therefore cannot 
validate certificates signed by a CA whose certificate is not in the database. The stan-
dard certificates include all necessary fields such as version and serial numbers, issuer, 
valid date, and fingerprint. 
As the SRP requires using HTTP over TLS, the functionality of the protocol pair 
and their appearance in the selected browsers are analysed. As a result, the following 
sections highlight the security features of HTTP over TLS, the overview of TLS in 
browsers, and the vulnerabilities in TLS. 
5.2.1 General Functionality of HTTP Over TLS 
The goal of TLS is to provide authentication, data confidentiality, and data integrity. 
Conventional HTTP server/client applications run on TCP port number 80. IfTLS is 
requested, then the connection is set to port 443 of the server by default [17]. TLS 
uses public key cryptography to enable mutual authentication between the server and 
the client, and applies symmetric key cryptography for the bulk data encryption. As 
HTTP is just a communication protocol, it would not impose any restriction on the 
file's content type for transfer. Setting security attributes of the file downloaded is also 
out of scope for HTTP. 
How HTTP over TLS initialises a connection between a server and a client is sum-
marised as follows [51]. 
1. The HTTP client initiates a connection to the server on the default port ( 443). 
2. The client begins the TLS handshake by sending the TLS client "Hello" message 
to the server. Server identification can be verified at this stage by using the 
hostname or IP address information presented in the server's certificate message. 
Checking the client identity is usually omitted by the server, though it is possible 
to achieve if the client has a certificate. 
3. Upon successful processing of the TLS handshake, the client sends the first 
HTTP request (for file downloading here) that must be sent as the TLS "ap-
plication data". The protocol identifier for HTTP/TLS is "https" and this usually 
appears in the URL, for example https://www.qut.edu.au. 
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4. To close the connection, a valid closure alert must be exchanged before the ac-
tual connection is closed. In this case, the session can be reused later. If the 
connection is closed without sending a valid closure alert, the session must not 
be reused. The reason for this is the TLS does not understand the HTTP mecha-
nism and cannot therefore determine whether a message has been truncated. 
Figure 5.1 illustrates the communication sequences of the TLS protocol between a 
browser and a server. 
Hello message 
Capabilities, requirements 
Certificate 
Request Certificate (optional) 
Client Encrypted key K Server 
Certificate (if requested) 
Session parameters 
Confirmation message 
Figure 5.1: Login process ofTLS 
5.2.2 TLS Overview in Browsers 
TLS version 1.0 is included in all the evaluated browsers for use. The TLS protocol, 
the successor of SSL, was developed by the Intemet Engineering Task Force (IETF), 
and is almost identical to SSL 3.0 except in its new approach to implementation i.e. 
an open and standards-based solution, using non-proprietary ciphers, improved error 
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reporting, and use of HMAC (a hash function based message authentication code) 
instead ofMD5 (Message-Digest Algorithm) [8]. 
TLS checks server's certificates in the first stage of communication with the server. 
The server's certificate is signed by a CA which is also shown in the certificate. As 
browsers store a list of root CA certificates which they consider trustworthy, the server's 
certificate can be verified. If a CA in a server's certificate is not included in the list, 
then browsers display a warning message and users have to decide whether or not to 
accept the certificates and continue to setup the connection. Upon users' acceptance of 
the server certificate, browsers store the CA certificate in the list for future use. 
5.2.3 Vulnerabilities in Implementations of TLS 
As mentioned above, TLS is the successor of SSL. TLS also inherits the SSL vulnera-
bilities. Since SSL vulnerabilities are broadly discussed in Section 2.3.1, the following 
is a brief discussion of the TLS vulnerability. The errors in the TLS implementations 
introduced vulnerability in private keys which are used for mutual authentication, and 
in session keys which are used for bulk data encryption. Some incidents in the past 
showed that the private keys in use can be recovered from memory, and session keys 
could also be recovered from the server messages responding to a number of struc-
tured request messages sent by a client (browsers). Like TLS programmers, the OS 
programmers also contribute vulnerabilities to TLS by leaving some security holes in 
the OS, by which attackers can insert malicious certificates into the trusted root CA list. 
This will result in users communicating with malicious servers. In addition, browsers 
themselves allow some protocols to display a visual TLS symbol while no actual TLS 
connection is in use, and this encourages browser users to send sensitive information 
such as passwords over insecure connections. 
As discussed in Section 2.3.1, these problems mentioned above are now rectified, 
and TLS is, in fact, an adequate secure connection protocol if it is configured properly 
and is used in conjunction with a secure operating system. 
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5.3 Audit Trail 
Auditing records users' activities with the associated identity and the time of the action. 
Recording security relevant events helps administrators to analyse how the security 
problems occurred or have been initiated. By having such records, administrators can 
eliminate security holes in browsers and identify the responsible users. However, the 
evaluated modem browsers do not generate audit data and it is left to the underlying 
OS, which vary in their scope for recording audit data. 
Even though the evaluated browsers do not generate audit records, a history file 
(created for each user as part of a user profile) in IE, Netscape, Opera, and Lynx contain 
accessed URLs with time stamps. IE and Netscape also record how many times a web 
page is visited but only Netscape can tell the first visit date and the last visit date for a 
particular web site. The research is also interested in the users' requested files and the 
downloaded files from servers, but have found that the history files have no information 
on them (though Opera records a list of downloaded files in the "download.dat" file). 
With RedHat Linux 7.3, browsers can record user name, time, any request, and er-
ror messages by using the logging utility. The majority oflogging in Linux is provided 
by two main programs, system log (syslog) and kernel log. The system log utility 
stores log files generated by various programs, especially the login program (logs all 
logins and logouts into the system) and the kernel log utility records system resources 
usages (logs all messages produced by kernel and system program) [53]. However, 
both Window 2000 and RedHat Linux 7.3 have the audit configuration for every file 
and it must allow the OS to record every system call. The logging utility can be used to 
generate a specific log file concerning users' activities with browsers for auditing pur-
pose. The research found that even though the syslog service is used at the discretion 
of the application, there is no information of user ID, access time, user request for web 
pages, and successful or fail result of the request in log files. 
On the other hand, Windows 2000 offers three types of event log, namely System 
log, Security log, and Application log. The system log generated by the operating sys-
tem contains events of system components, for example the failure of a driver or other 
system component to load during startup. The application log generated by applica-
tions contains records of errors with the application developer deciding which events 
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to record. The security log specified by administrators can record security events such 
as valid and invalid logon attempts, resource use, and creating, opening, or deleting 
files .. The Event Log service starts automatically when Windows 2000 starts and the 
log file can be viewed via Event Viewer which displays error messages, warning mes-
sages, information on operations of an application, and audited security access. By 
default, application and system logs can be viewed by all users, but security logs are 
accessible only to administrators. Administrators can restrict access to the log files 
by using the access control mechanisms described in Section 5.1.2. Security logging 
that is turned offby default can also be enabled by administrators. However, Windows 
2000 does not record users' interactiop.s with applications (they only record changing 
attributes of files or directories) except if the application implements its own logging. 
The browsers investigated do not use the Windows 2000 logging facility. 
Therefore, the research concludes that the evaluated browsers do not generate the 
security audit records required by the SRP for browsers. 
5.4 Access Restriction 
As described in Section 4.3.1, access restriction is one of the desirable objectives be-
cause it provides administrators with control over a particular user downloading a spe-
cific file type through a secure connection. In order to prevent virus attacks, for ex-
ample, users should not be able to download executable file types such as files with 
extension "exe", "ps", etc. Thus, the access restriction mechanism needs information 
of user identity, restricted file type, and verification on whether a secure connection 
is required, so it can use these information to determine which files are acceptable to 
download by whom. The only problem with this is that today browsers have no feature 
for administrators to restrict file type for downloading, even though restricting file type 
can increase browser security. 
The only available feature in relation to access restriction is a file download op-
tion from Internet Explorer which allows users to choose whether or not to have the 
browser download files. The file downloading option does not apply to FTP files and 
files displayed by browsers or helper applications. Thus, users can still read and save 
web pages as long as the browser displays them (with or without a helper applica-
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· tion). Netscape, Opera, and Lynx offer neither file download options nor features for 
restricting file type. 
In general, browsers save the downloaded file to a temporary location and then 
pass it to the appropriate program (a helper application) for display. If the helper 
application is not available then users are prompted to save the file onto storage. So it 
is impossible to stop users downloading files but it is unlikely that the users are able to 
view the downloaded file without a helper application. All the evaluated browsers have 
an option for users for setting file types and the associated applications. However, if the 
operating system is configured by an administrator so that users cannot install helper 
applications, then some control over the types of files a user can view is obtained. 
In summary, access restriction in the evaluated browsers does not meet ·~ccess 
restriction" objective of the SRP for browsers. 
5.5 Summary 
This chapter highlights security features in major browsers and the TLS secure connec-
tion protocol. It is noted that none of the selected browsers allow client hosts to log the 
activity of the protocol itself or to restrict file type for downloading. In all browsers, 
user identification, access control, and time functions are supported by the underlying 
operating system. The findings of this analysis are applied in a prototype model for a 
secure browser outlined in the next chapter. 
76 
Chapter 6 
Case Study 
In Chapter 2, the research investigated the security measures provided by the cur-
rent browsers, and the findings were used to construct a SRP for browsers (in Chap-
ter 4). Using the SRP, the research was then extended in Chapter 5 to analyse modem 
browsers and a file transferring protocol (HTTP/TLS) in order to determine what se-
curity requirements they support. As none of the browsers analysed offers all security 
requirements required by the SRP, the research has implemented a prototype model for 
a secure browser. The Lynx text-only browser was modified to demonstrate that the 
model is achievable. 
This case study involves outlining a prototype model and modification of an ex-
isting browser in order to meet the defined prototype model. The prototype model is 
a framework for a secure browser program that can be used to download data (files) 
securely from a remote server. The model consists of five security requirements: user 
identification and access control, cryptographic mechanism, limitation on file type, file 
attribute, and audit trail. For the source code modification, the Lynx browser is chosen 
due to its relatively simple features and it is also available as an open source code. 
The chapter is organised as follows. In Section 6.1, the desired design requirements 
are highlighted. Sections 6.2 - 6.6 explain how each component of the prototype de-
sign will function and interact with other components and/or the underlying operating 
system. Section 6. 7 contains the rationale of the prototype design. The chapter finishes 
with a summary in Section 6.8. 
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6.1 Design Requirements 
The prototype model is carefully designed to achieve security objectives identified in 
the SRP for browsers discussed in Chapter 4 (see also Appendix A for details). The 
security objectives that are identified in the SRP and which the research has set out to 
achieve are: 
• Auditing: to record security relevant events to hold individual users accountable 
for the actions they have performed. 
• Restriction: to limit access to a browser and to download the permitted file types 
only. Permission on file type is imposed only by the administrator. 
• Authentication: to provide a mutual authentication mechanism to verify the iden-
tity of servers by users and vice versa. 
• Confidentiality: to ensure that data cannot be illegitimately eavesdropped or ob-
tained during transmission. 
• Integrity: to ensure that the integrity of the downloaded files is maintained during 
transmission. 
With the aim to overcome limitations encountered in the browser analysis in the Chap-
ter 5, the prototype design as shown in Figure 6.1 is built using five core mechanism 
components: user identification, cryptographic mechanism, file type limitation, file at-
tribute, and audit trail. The components and their functionality details are given in the 
following sections. 
6.2 User Identification and Access Control 
The user identification component is necessary because it verifies a user who attempts 
to use the program. The component communicates with the underlying operating sys-
tem and validates the user according to the credentials provided by the operating sys-
tem, which has already successfully identified and authenticated the user during the 
login procedure prior to allowing the use of the computer. 
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Figure 6.1: A prototype design architecture of a secure browser 
Security for this mechanism relies totally on the underlying OS and the reason for 
trusting the OS is that modern OSs conventionally identify and authenticate users as 
part of their own access control mechanism, thereby the model shouldn't reiterate this 
authentication process. These available secure authentication mechanisms are imple-
mented by particular interest groups focusing only on a specific area, and the developed 
authentication mechanisms allow organisations to choose an appropriate one from the 
many variants (e.g., from simple password authentication to smart card with public key 
cryptography). It is assumed that more and more secure authentication mechanisms, 
particularly in network environments, will emerge since there is much research being 
undertaken currently in this area. 
By default, the Lynx browser can be started by all users of the host computer. 
Lynx, like other browser applications, relies on the operating system for user identifi-
cation and authentication. This research does not investigate the necessity of applying 
user identification and authentication functions when a user starts the browser, be-
cause there is not much chance to stop the user who has successfully logged in (by any 
means). 
Overall, the research is satisfied with the functionality of the current operating 
systems in terms of identification and access control mechanisms. 
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6.3 Cryptographic Mechanism 
This component is used to perform crucial functions such as a mutual authentication 
between a user and a remote server to ensure that they are both legitimate. It also en-
crypts data before transmission to ensure that data integrity and data confidentiality are 
obtained. Functionality of the components is the same as for the HTTP/TLS protocol. 
A public key cryptographic mechanism is employed for mutual authentication. For 
that purpose, both the remote server and the user must have public key certificates to 
provide their credentials. The certificates can be issued by either a trusted third party 
or an internal key issue centre of the organisation. 
The summary of the mutual authentication and key exchange mechanism are as 
follows (from TLS): 
• The client sends a request for server ID (a public key certificate) 
• The server returns its ID and a request for the client's ID 
• The client returns its ID and a proposal of a session key for data encryption and 
decryption 
• The server sends its agreement on the session key 
Upon receiving a request for file to transfer, the server encrypts the requested file 
using a symmetric key (agreed to and generated by both parties during the key agree-
ment process), then sends it to the user. This simple single step supports confiden-
tiality of the file so it can only be decrypted using an appropriate key. To achieve 
data integrity, the server generates a value (e.g., MAC) that is associated with both 
the contents of the file transferred and the identity of the server. Browsers can com-
pute a value using the same method the server used and compares it with the one the 
server has provided. If the two values are identical then the file's integrity has been 
maintained. 
For Lynx, there is no need to implement a mechanism for data confidentiality and 
integrity since TLS can be compiled into Lynx as additional component. 
The Lynx browser makes use of cryptographic mechanisms in establishing a secure 
connection with remote servers. In fact, Lynx provides TLS which extends the security 
of transmitted data by encrypting data via a public key cryptographic mechanism. 
80 
The model only uses certificates for browsers and servers issued by the same inter-
nal or trusted third party CAs. The model itself would neither generate certificates for 
browser nor accept any server certificate from intrusted CAs. This requirement would 
reduce the possibility of users falling into man-in-the-middle attacks1, because the cer-
tificates used by the client's browser and the connected server are issued by the same 
CA, thus less likely for the attackers to obtain the valid certificate. 
As highlighted in Section 2.3 .1, TLS has software flaws and a problem with private 
key storage. However, implementing a new mechanism to replace TLS or enhancing 
TLS is out of scope for this research, and the research is satisfied with the method 
of cooperation between Lynx and TLS. Hence TLS is used in the model for a secure 
connection. 
6.4 Limitation on File Type 
This component allows administrators to put constraints on permitted file types for 
downloading. The administrators are able to compile a list of allowed file types for 
downloading by selecting them from the built-in predefined list. When users make a 
request to download files, the model verifies the requested files according to the list 
and makes a decision on whether to allow or deny. 
In addition to determine file type for filtering mechanisms, the model will use the 
MIME mechanism since it has been used as a standard for file type verification in 
many data transferring applications (e.g., email) [21]. However, the research is aware 
that servers check file extensions to determine the MIME type and a file extension can 
be modified by anyone with an appropriate access right to the file. This problem is 
overcome by using TLS, the secure connection. 
The research has found that there is a mechanism for determining the file type 
implemented in UNIX environments, known as the "file" command. The mechanism 
consists of three sets of tests performed in order: 
1. Filesystem tests: use system call ("stat" - distinguishes between directories, sym-
bolic links, and normal files) and examine the result. 
1 an attacker, who appears to be a connecting server to a client (browser) and acts as a client to the 
connecting server, relays data packets between a browser and a server. 
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2. Magic number tests: check for data in particular fixed formats (numbers stored 
in a particular place near the beginning of the file). 
3. Language tests: at this stage it is assumed that the file is a text file. The test will 
then look for particular strings to determine the written language. For example, 
the keyword "struct" indicates a C program. 
Future research may investigate the "file" mechanism and find a possible way to im-
plement it in heterogeneous operating system environments, as the mechanism appears 
to be useful in ascertaining malicious data such as virus files. It is however out of the 
scope of the current research and this mechanism is currently available only in UNIX 
environments. 
In summary, the research has decided to use MIME for determining file type in this 
model. 
6.4.1 Filtering File Types 
Lynx unconditionally allows users to access files in any fonnat (file extensions). How-
ever, security for browsers is concerned with file types in relation to their capabilities to 
access system resources and compromise system security. Therefore the Lynx source 
code is examined to see if it can be altered to obtain the file type restriction option. 
The examination shows that browser's requests can be placed in two categories. 
1. A user's request for a home page is actually asking for a file which can be any 
type depending on the server configuration. Browsers won't know the requested 
file type until they receive a HTTP header from servers indicating contents type 
(using MIME format). 
2. Most requests for file downloading usually end with a file extension which is 
required for an appropriate file handling process. 
The experimentation shows that Lynx can be modified to restrict file type by using 
two different methods: granting access if users' requested file extension is valid and 
granting access if users' requested file is a valid MIME file type. 
Note that the valid file extension and MIME types for file downloading are set by 
the administrators as was explained in Section 6.4. The first mechanism works well 
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if the requested URL shows a file extension while the second mechanism supports 
file type restriction in more standard means. The implemented two file type filtering 
mechanisms are explained in detail in the following sections. 
6.4.1.1 Granting access to valid file extension 
As an experiment, additional code. is added into the Lynx source code in order to filter 
users' requests by checking the file extensions against a list compiled by administra-
tors. The sequence processes involved in checking the file extensions as shown in 
Figure 6.2 are: 
1. User requests URL. 
2. The browser checks the file extension against the list. 
3. If the requested file is a permitted file type, then the request is sent to the server. 
4. If the requested file is not a permitted file type, then the request is discarded and 
an error message is displayed. 
Browser 
1. userr Request 
2. Check File Extension 
/~ 
3a. Restricted 3b. Permitted 
Extension Extension 
1 1 
4a. Display 4b. Proceed Server 
Error Message Requests 
Figure 6.2: File extension filtering processes. 
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The result of the experiment has shown that the filtering mechanism is effective 
and efficient for the requests containing file extension. However, some requests do 
not show extensions and thus give no indication of the file type which can be varied 
depending on the server-side script. The research therefore implemented the second 
mechanism which made use of MIME file type in order to filter users' requests. The 
following section discusses the file type filtering mechanism using MIME specifica-
tion. 
Browser 
1. use'J' Request Server 
2. Check File Type 
/ ~ 
3a. Restricted 3b. Permitted 
File Type File Type 
1 1 
4a. Display 4b.Save 
Error File 
Figure 6.3: MIME type filtering processes. 
6.4.1.2 Granting access to valid MIME file type 
As discussed in Section 6.4, MIME is used by many Internet applications such as 
Internet mail services. In general, MIME provides browsers with media type data for 
identification purposes. The sequence processes for filtering MIME type as shown in 
Figure 6.3 are: 
1. User request URL. 
2. The modified Lynx browser sends the request to a server. 
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3. The server replies with a HTTP header indicating the file type in MIME specific 
format. 
4. The browser checks the file type against the banned MIME type list compiled by 
administrators. 
5. If the requested file type is in the list, the browser displays an error message as 
shown in Figure 6.4. 
6. If the type is permitted, the downloading continues. 
This filtering process is tested and found working well. For the testing purpose, the 
postscript file type was put in the banned list (for example, "application/postscript"). 
When users tried to access a file with extension ".ps", the request was rejected and a 
error message (compiled in the messages file of Lynx by the researcher) was displayed 
as shown in Figure 6.4. However, users successfully accessed any other files with dif-
ferent file extensions, because only ".ps" file extension was not permitted to download 
in this experiment. The experiment has verified that this method is simple and effec-
tive for administrators in restricting users' access on different file types. Therefore, 
this method is chosen to be used in the secure browser model. 
The research also programmed the browser to log every request and its subsequent 
occurrences such as the request is denied, or downloading is cancelled or completed. 
6.4.2 Configuration for Helper Applications 
As discussed in Section 6.4.1, browsers use a list of the registered file types and associ-
ated applications to determine the downloaded file type. It is important to mention that 
Windows 2000 and RedHat Linux 7.3 allow only system administrators to modify the 
registered file types and their associated applications. The model is therefore designed 
to use the OS's registered file types in finding the associated helper application for a 
particular file type. 
6.5 File Attribute 
In Chapter 5 (Section 5.1.2), the research examined the mechanisms for setting at-
tributes in the most commonly used operating systems, Windows 2000 and RedHat 
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Figure 6.4: Lynx browser displaying an error message. 
Linux 7.3. It is noted that RedHat Linux 7.3 has implemented three types of user 
(owner, group, and others) and each type has three access attributes (read, write, and 
execute), whereas Windows has created 7 types of access attribute (read, write, exe-
cute, delete, change permission, take ownership, and full control) for file and an extra 
two types (add and list) for directories. 
The model has some procedures for requesting and maintaining files and their as-
sociated access attributes, which are set by the remote servers. It is noted that access 
attributes used in UNIX and Windows operating systems (most commonly used OSs) 
are not compatible or convertible. The model could overcome the problem (only if 
servers and users use different operating systems) by implementing an option for set-
ting default attributes for files downloaded. For example, file owners and administra-
tors will have "full control" in Windows and "read write execute" in UNIX, but none 
for others. 
By default, Windows 2000 and RedHat Linux 7.3 set full control permission for 
the file owners (who downloads the file) and read permission for other users for the 
downloaded files. This means that a user can read other users' files and subsequently 
confidentiality of the user data fails. The prototype model therefore sets "Full control 
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for owner and no access for others" as a default attribute by using the "urnask" facility 
, however it can be changed by system administrators. In an experiment with the modi-
fied Lynx, the research was able to successfully set the default attributes to downloaded 
files (e.g, a file owner can read and write but others can neither read nor write). Thus, 
this component effectively supports security attributes for downloaded files. 
6.6 Audit Trail 
As discussed in Chapter 5 (Section 5.3), security auditing is necessary because it 
records users' activities with the associated identity and the time of the action. Ad-
ministrators can use the audit file to analyse how security problems, if any, occurred or 
have been initiated, and consequently they can reduce security incidences in browsers 
and can also identify the responsible users. However, the browser evaluation shows 
that the analysed browsers do not generate audit data, even though Section 5.3 high-
lights that the underlying OS (Windows 2000 and RedHat Linux 7.3) have built-in 
features with which the browsers' programmers can generate audit data and pass it to 
the OS for secure storage. 
To fulfil the much needed audit feature for browsers, the prototype model has a 
component to generate audit data containing crucial information such as user iden-
tification, time, and the activities made. The underlying OS is used to provide user 
information, accurate time, and a secure storage for audit data. The model records 
them along with the user requested web pages for viewing or downloading. The audit 
data is then passed to the operating system for protection and storage purposes. 
To demonstrate that a log file can be successfully generated, additional code (for 
Window 2000; create, open, write, and close file and for Linux 7.3; syslog() utility) is 
added into Lynx source code to create its own log file. The log file is created the first 
time the browser is used and a system call is used to write information into the file. 
Once the file is created, information is added into the file each time a user accesses a 
web page. 
The modified Lynx browser also made use of system calls to obtain user account 
name, identification number, and time of access. A standard operating system pro-
vides user information and system time in response to the system calls "id" and "time" 
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Figure 6.5: The contents of the audit file. 
respectively. Since the name of the downloaded file and the visited URLs are also 
required for audit trail, Lynx is programmed to obtain any request made by users and 
whether or not the downloading was successful. Thus the modified Lynx browser can 
successfully intercept all users' requests to record the URL along with user name and 
time in the log file before it filters the request for file type restriction as described in 
Section 6.4.1. Note that most browsers create a history file for each user which con-
tains only the visited URL, the web page title, and time ofthe access. Figure 6.5 shows 
the contents of a log file generated by the enhanced Lynx browser. 
6. 7 The Prototype Model Rationale 
In Section 6.1, the design requirements is discussed in relation to five security objec-
tives described in the SRP. These design requirements are fully met by the model as 
shown in Table 6.1 matching the design requirements to the security components of 
the model. 
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Design requirements Model's components I 
Auditing Audit trail component 
Restriction User identification component 
File type limitation component 
Authentication Cryptographic component 
Confidentiality Cryptographic component 
File transferring component 
Integrity Cryptographic component 
File transferring component 
Table 6.1: Tracing of design requirements to the prototype model's components 
6.8 Summary 
A prototype design for a secure browser has been discussed with its five components: 
user identification, cryptographic component, limitation on file type, file transferring 
process, and audit trails. The prototype model was designed to achieve objectives 
identified in the preferred SRP for browser (Appendix A). The model also overcomes 
limitations encountered in the file transferring protocols analysis in Chapter 5. For 
demonstration purposes, extra components are added into the Lynx browser source 
code and tested it to prove that the model is achievable. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusions and Future Directions 
This thesis has examined security in browsers which is extremely important. Most 
users of browsers do not properly understand the risks associated with connecting to, 
and obtaining data from, a potentially untrusted server on the Internet. Security in 
browsers was addressed in terms of downloaded data confidentiality and integrity ( ob-
tained via authentication), auditing both data transfers and users' activity, and restrict-
ing the downloaded file type. 
To properly discuss security in browsers, it is necessary to understand what mo-
tivation leads toward the browsers development and what services are available in 
browsers. As browsers have been implemented for accessing information within an 
organisation, browsers themselves and the services they offer have little security for 
users. That was fine in those days when computers with a few services were only used 
for research and military applications. It has however become a major problem now 
that computers are accessible by everyone, and more services are embedded. The most 
useful and perhaps dangerous service is the file handling service where a downloaded 
file is immediately transferred to an appropriate application for further processing. 
Browser security requirements can be determined by identifying threats, vulner-
abilities, and countermeasures. Threats exist in the connecti9n between clients and 
servers, in downloaded data content, or on the browser's host. Threats in the cmmec-
tion come from the TCP/IP protocol suite implemented without security considerations 
in the first place. Since servers are meant to provide the information requested, threats 
to file content are mostly handled by browsers. Host security is also important because 
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anyone who administers a host can control the installed browser as well. Many inci-
dents have occurred in the past proving that vulnerabilities exist in browsers. Many of 
them are caused by flaws in programming. Currently patches for these problems are 
available but not all administrators apply them in a timely fashion. There are many ad-
ditional security tools providing host security and connection security, however these 
solutions can increase the complexity of the problem due to the interaction between 
the browser itself and additional security tools. 
This research used the international security evaluation mechanism, the Common 
Criteria to assess security in browsers. Following the CC approach, a security require-
ments profile for browsers was developed. 
Browsers utilise a number of protocols and the core protocols among them are the 
file transferring protocols, the accountable protocols for a browser's main functions. 
As their functionality and security impact browser security, an analysis of the com-
mon file transferring protocols - HTTP, FTP, SCP, and FTAM - was conducted. The 
research shows that none of these protocols (without TLS) meets the security require-
ments identified in the SRP, such as audit data generation, user data protection, trusted 
channels. 
However, the thesis includes a prototype model that realises a secure browser. The 
prototype model was implemented using the Lynx browser source code that is publicly 
available. With modifications, the browser can be made more secure. 
This work has focussed on the browser end and can be extended to the server end, 
since a secure server would enforce the security requirements defined in the secure 
browser model. For example, a secure browser may insist on the use of public key 
cryptography for connections, which can be realistic, only if the connected server sup-
ports such a feature and communicates with the client in that particular way. 
There is more work required in the area of determining the type of the downloaded 
file. Currently the MIME mechanism is used to specify file type. The research found 
that MIME makes use of file extension in file type detennination and file extensions are 
recognised when proprietors register them with lANA [1]. Once a file type has been 
registered with an extension, all applications acknowledge any file with such extension 
as it is, even though file extensions can be altered easily. 
It is possible, and maybe difficult, to record a file type in relation to its format 
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. as every file has its own way of formatting. To make it simple and effective, the 
research suggests that a file type is encoded and inserted in a file as a water mark, 
hence applications can read the code whilst alteration is infeasible. This can be an area 
for future research. 
As has been demonstrated in this thesis, a secure browser can be implemented 
by modifying current browsers, and if commercial browsers would follow this simple 
innovation, both users and service providers, in other words clients and servers, can 
benefit from this research. 
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Appendix A 
Security Requirements Profile for 
Browsers 
Version l.Oa 
March 2001 
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Conventions and Terminology 
Conventions 
The notation, formatting, and conventions used in this profile follow those given in 
version 2.1 of the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluations. 
The Common Criteria documents may be obtained on-line from the International Com-
mon Criteria Project horne page (www.commoncriteria.org). 
Terminology 
In this section, terms used within this profile are defined that are additional to the 
terminology given by the Common Criteria version 2.1 - Part I. 
• Secure channel: a communication channel that provides security for data trans-
mitted via that channel. 
• File type: format of data in a file, the TOE decides this based on the extension 
of the file. 
• Interpreter application: the application to which the TOE forwards a down-
loaded file in order for the file to be processed or displayed. 
• Security relevant action: actions that are regarded as affecting TOE security, 
for example, obtaining access to the TOE or its data. 
• Security level: the selected security assurance level. (e.g., evaluation assurance 
level - EAL level) 
• User identity: identity of the user who wishes to use or is using the TOE facility 
to download a file from a remote server. 
• Object identity: the name of the requested file to be downloaded. 
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A.l Introduction 
A.l.l Identification 
Title: Security Requirements Profile for Browsers 
Authors: Nwe Nwe Hlaing, Rose-Marie Henderson, and Andrew Clark, 
Information Security Research Centre, 
Queensland University of Technology, 
Brisbane 4001, Australia. 
CC Version: 2.1 Final 
General Status: Draft 
Registration: 
Keywords: file downloading, remote server, file type 
A.1.2 Security Requirements Profile (SRP) Overview 
This profile defines the security requirements and assurance requirements for a pro-
gram (software application) used to download files from a remote server. The program 
downloads a particular file in response to a user's request provided the type of the 
file is allowed. In addition, this PP specifies security requirements for forwarding the 
downloaded file to an appropriate program which in turn processes or displays the file. 
A.1.3 Related Protection Profiles 
This profile could be used in conjunction with the "Rudimentary Web Server Pro-
tection Profile" to in addition allow access to local files from remote locations. The 
TOE described in the SRP relies on the secure operation of the underlying Operating 
System. Two PPs relating to Operating Systems are the Controlled Access Protection 
Profile (CAPP) and Labeled Security Protection Profile (LSPP) although these do not 
cover all functionality required to support TOE operation. 
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A.2 TOE Description 
The TOE is a software application used to find files on a (remote) server and direct the 
server to fetch and transmit the requested files as appropriate. 
The TOE provides user services such as making a connection to the requested file 
server, making requests for transmission of the desired file, protection of transmitted 
data, and delivering the obtained files to an appropriate program on the requesting host 
for interpretation. Figure 1 depicts the logical interaction between the client (with the 
TOE and an interpreter application) and a server. The TOE proceeds with the request 
for downloading of the file only if the file type is a permitted file type. 
Client 
r-- ·-·--·-·----• I 
I 
I 
TOE. I 
I (1) N etv:rork Protocol 
! C2) File type 
t . . . ~ 
1 Dwvm.loadreques:t 
I 
(4) The Requested File 
Files(5) 
lntei1Jl'eter 
• Appl:icatiou : 
·-- ------------ J 
Server 
Figure A.l: The browser architecture 
The TOE is configurable by the user or an administrator to prevent the download 
of specified file types. It is assumed that the remote servers have the necessary mecha-
nisms for designating a file's type and conveying this infonnation to the TOE. The TOE 
is able to set up and maintain a secure channel between the TOE and remote servers 
in order to protect the transmitted data. This requires the co-operation of the remote 
server and it is therefore necessary that remote servers, with which the TOE communi-
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cates securely, supports this ability. The requirement for a secure channel between the 
TOE and remote servers is a configurable option by users and the administrator but the 
administrators configuration will override a users configuration. The administrator's 
configuration shall override the user's configuration for both file type restrictions and 
secure channel requirements. Existing protocols such as FTP and HTTP have limita-
tions which are addressed by this TOE. For example the ability for administrators to 
place restrictions on the file types for downloading (in a configuration file) and man-
dating secure chrumels for selected remote servers. This also helps avoid accidental 
access to files or downloading by users without proper security controls being used. 
The SR.P is applicable to programs that enable users to remotely obtain files from 
a server, which responds with data that can be encapsulated in a file and interpreted by 
an application familiar with the format of that file. The SR.P is not intended to cover 
either the underlying operating system or interpreter applications. These aspects will 
be separately covered by associated PPs and the TOE will rely on such services being 
in place. Note that existing PPs relevant to this SR.P have been outlined in Section 1.3. 
The TOE takes human users as active entities, which request a process that initi-
ates a communication between the TOE and a remote server. The users are identified 
and authenticated by the operating system before they are given access to the TOE. 
The operating system is also responsible for controlling access to the configuration 
data of the TOE. Administrators are able to manage a configuration file for the TOE, 
which shall meet an organisation's security policies. Users may limit their own per-
sonal configuration file but the configuration file of the administrator overrides any 
user configuration. 
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A.3 TOE Security Environment 
A.3.1 Secure Usage Assumptions 
• A.ACCESS:. All access to the TOE and its data is controlled by the Operating 
System (including TOE audit data). 
• A.STORAGE: The Operating System provides secure storage for all TOE data 
(including all TOE audit data). 
• A.AUTHN: The Operating System will authenticate a user prior to granting ac-
cess to the TOE. 
• A.IDENTITY: The Operating System provides the TOE with all required user 
identification information. 
• A.MALICIOUS: Downloaded files are checked by the Operating System to de-
termine if they contain malicious data. 
• A.ADMIN: System administrators manage the TOE and the information it con-
tains, and can be trusted not to abuse their privileges. 
• A.SERVER: The servers, with which the TOE interacts, are regarded as trust-
worthy. 
• A.OSCNTRL: The Operating System securely controls all information exchange 
with the TOE. 
A.3.2 Threats to Security 
• T.ABUSE: Authorised users may perform actions that are not permitted. 
• T.ADMIN: Administrators may commit errors in installation, configuration, or 
management of the TOE, compromising security. 
• T.AUDIT: Users may perform undetected security relevant actions. 
• T.CAPTURE: A file or data transferred between a remote server and the TOE 
may be exposed and captured by an illegitimate user. 
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• T.INTG: Modifications during transmission may lead to alteration ofthe file type 
or the transmitted data. 
• T.SPOOF: A server may be spoofed. 
• T.SWFLAW: TOE software flaws may allow users to download files of illicit 
file type or result in the TOE forwarding the downloaded file to an inappropriate 
application. 
• T.CRASH: Human error, a failure of software, hardware or environmental sup-
port (e.g. power failure) may cause an abrupt interruption to TOE operation. 
A.3.3 Organisational Security Policies 
• P.ACCOUNT: Users shall be held accountable for their actions. 
A.4 Security Objectives 
A.4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE 
• O.AUDIT: The TOE must provide the means for recording security relevant 
events to hold individual users accountable for the actions they perform. 
• O.RESTRICT: The TOE must limit access to authorised users and to download 
of files of permitted files type and in accordance to configurations requiring se-
cured exchanges with remote server where any limitations imposed by the ad-
ministrator override those of all users. 
• O.AUTHN: The TOE must provide an authentication mechanism to verify the 
identity of servers with which it interacts. 
• O.CONFD: The TOE must ensure that data or files can not be illegitimately 
obtained by the unauthorised person during transmission. 
• O.INTG: The TOE must be able to indicate that the integrity of downloaded files 
and data is maintained during transmission. 
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A.4.2 Security Objectives for the Environment 
• OE.OS: The Operating System with an appropriate security level must provide 
security relevant information and services to the TOE (such as access to TOE 
data, secure storage for TOE data, authenticating users before granting access to 
the TOE, providing using identity information to the TOE, and checking down-
loaded data for malicious data). 
• OE. TRAIN: Administrators and users must be adequately trained to manage and 
operate the TOE and maintain TOE security. 
• OE. SERVER: The TOE must only be allowed to interact with trustworthy servers. 
• OE.OPERATE: Those responsible for the TOE must ensure that the TOE is in-
stalled, configured, managed, and operated in a secure manner. 
• OE.SUPPORT: Those responsible for services external to TOE, but necessary to 
TOE operation, must maintain continuity of these services. 
• OE.ACCOUNT: An audit mechanism must be in place to provide user account-
ability. 
• OE.OSCNTRL: The Operating System must secure and control all information 
exchanges between itself and the TOE. 
A.5 IT Security Requirements 
This section outlines the security requirements selected to meet the objectives iden-
tified in Section 4. The security requirements are Security Functional Requirements 
(SFRs) selected from Part 2 of the CC or Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) 
selected from Part 3 of the CC. 
A.5.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements 
Table 1 outlines the SFRs selected to meet the TOE objectives. All dependencies 
are met excepting the dependency on FMT _MSA.3. A discussion of dependencies is 
included in Section 6.2 Security Requirements Rationale. 
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Class Functional Component Dependencies 
Security audit FAU_GEN.l Audit data generation FPT_STM.l 
(FAU) 
FAU_GEN.2 User identity association FAU_GEN.l 
FIA_UID.l 
User data pro- FDP .lFC.l Subset information flow control FDP.JFF.l 
tection (FDP) 
FDP .JFF.l Simple security attributes FDP .JFC.l 
FMT_MSA.l 
-
FMT_MSA.3 
FMT_SMR.l 
Identification FIA_UID.2 User identification before any ac- None 
and Authentica- tion 
tion (FIA) 
Protection of the FPT _STM.l Reliable time stamps None 
TOE Security 
Functions (FPT) 
Trusted FTP .JTC.l Inter-TSF trusted channel None 
path! channels 
(FTP) 
Table A.l: Security Functional Requirements 
A.5.1.1 Security Audit (FAU) 
Audit data generation (FAU_GEN.l) 
• (FAU_GEN.l.l): The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the fol-
lowing auditable events: 
a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions; 
b) All auditable events for the [selection: basic] level of audit; and 
c) [assignment: other specifically defined auditable events]. 
Note: auditable events are given in Table A.2. 
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• (FAU_GEN.l.2): The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the fol-
lowing information: 
a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity, and the outcome 
(success or failure) of the event; and 
b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the 
functional components included in the PP/ST, [assignment: other audit relevant 
information] 
User identity association (FAU_GEN.2) 
• (FAU_GEN.2.1) The TSF shall be able to associate each auditable event with the 
identity of the user that caused the event. 
Functional Level Auditable Event 
Component 
FDP __IFF.l Basic All decisions on requests for information flow. 
FIA_UID.2 Basic All use of the user identification mechanism, including 
the user identity provided 
FPT_STM.l Minimal Changes to the time. 
FTP __ITC.l Basic All attempted uses of the trusted channel functions. 
Identification of the initiator and target of all trusted 
channel functions. 
Table A.2: Auditable Events 
A.5.1.2 User Data Protection (FDP) 
File Download (information flow control) SFP: Requests from authorised users for 
a file download from a remote server shall be permitted subject to the following con-
ditions: 
1. If the file type is a permitted file type according to the administrators configura-
tion. 
2. If the file type is a permitted file type according to the users configuration. 
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3. A secure communication channel can be established with the remote server when 
required by administrator configuration settings. 
4. A secure communication channel can be established with the remote server when 
required by the users configuration settings. 
Note: Alterations to configurations settings are controlled by the Operating System 
which passes this information as well as the identity to the TOE for execution of the 
downloading of files. 
Subset information flow control (FDP JFC.l) 
• (FDP .lFC.l.l) The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: File Download SFP] on 
[assignment: all user requests for downloading of a file]. 
Simple security attributes (FDP JFF.l) 
• (FDP .lFF.l.l): The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: File Download SFP] 
based on the following types of subject and information security attributes: [as-
signment: the users identity, the file type, the ability of the TOE and remote 
server to establish a secure connection for communicating the file from the re-
mote server to the TOE]. 
• (FDP .1FF.l.2): The TSF shall pennit an information flow between a controlled 
subject and controlled information via a controlled operation if the following 
rules hold: [assignment: subject to the conditions outlined in the File Download 
SFP]. 
• (FDP .JFF.1.3): The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: additional information 
flow control SFP rules]. 
• (FDP _IFF.1.4): The TSF shall provide the following [assignment: list of addi-
tional SFP capabilities]. 
• (FDP .1FF.1.5): The TSF shall explicitly authorise an infonnation flow based 
on the following rules: [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that 
explicitly authorise information flows]. 
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• FDP .JFF.l.6: The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the 
following rules: [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly 
deny information flows]. 
A.5.1.3 Identification and Authentication (FIA) 
User identification before any action (FIA_UID.2) 
• (FIA_UID.2.1): The TSF shall require each user to identify itselfbefore allowing 
any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user. 
A.5.1.4 Protection of the TOE Security Functions (FPT) 
Reliable time stamps (FPT _STM.l) 
• (FPT _STM.l.l) The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps for its own 
use. 
A.5.1.5 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP) 
Inter-TSF trusted channel (FTP _ITC.l) 
• (FTP .JTC.l.l): The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself 
and a remote trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communica-
tion channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection 
of the channel data from modification or disclosure. 
• (FTP .JTC.l.2): The TSF shall permit [selection: the TSF] to initiate communi-
cation via the trusted channel. 
• (FTP .JTC.1.3): The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel 
for [assignment: communications between and downloading of files from remote 
servers subject to the user and administrator configuration files subject to the 
condition that administrator configurations override those of users]. 
A.5.2 TOE Security Assurance Requirements 
The Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) selected for this PP are given in Table 
3 below. The selected SARs are identical to those of the Evaluation Assurance Level 
EAL3 from Part 3 of the CC. 
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Assurance Class Assurance Components 
ClassACM ACM_CAP.3 Authorisation controls 
Configuration Management ACM_SCP.l TOE CM coverage 
Class ADO ADO_DEL.l Delivery procedures 
Delivery and Operation ADOJGS.l Installation, generation, and start-up 
procedures 
Class ADV ADV _.FSP.l Informal functional specification 
Development ADV _HLD .2 Security. enforcing high-level design 
ADV_RCR.l Informal correspondence demonstra-
tion 
Class AGD AGD..ADM.l Administrator guidance 
Guidance Documents AGD_USR.l User guidance 
ClassALC ALC_DVS .1 Identification of security measures 
Life Cycle Support 
Class ATE ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage 
Tests ATE_DPT.l Testing: high-level design 
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing 
ATEJND .2 Independent testing - sample 
Class AVA AVA.MSU.1 Examination of guidance 
Vulnerability Assessment AVA_SOF.1 Strength of TOE security function eval-
uation 
AVA_ VLA.1 Developer vulnerability analysis 
Table A.3: Security Assurance Requirements: EAL3 
A.5.3 Security Requirements for the IT Environment 
The following requirements are selected as SMT .MSA.3 is required by the TOE but is 
to be performed by the Operating System with which the TOE interacts. It is necessary 
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I 
that the Operating System manage all of the configuration files and access to those 
files securely as the TOE depends upon this. These requirements are all dependencies 
relating to SMR_MSA.3 and operations have been performed to specifically tailor them 
to the TOE requirements. 
A.5.3.1 Identification and authentication (FIA) 
Timing of identification (FIA_UID.l) 
• (FIA_UID.l.l): The TSF shall allow [assignment: no actions] on behalf of the 
user to be performed before the user is identified. This includes access to the 
TOE and TOE related data. 
• (FIA_UID.1.2): The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified 
before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user. 
A.5.3.2 Security Management (FMT) 
Management of security attributes (FMT _MSA.l) 
• (FMT_MSA.l.l): The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: (named) access con-
trol SFP] to restrict the ability to [selection: query, modifY [assignment: other 
operations]] the security attributes [assignment: a users configurationfiles] to 
[assignment: the authorised user]. 
• (FMT_MSA.l.l): The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: (named) access con-
trol SFP] to restrict the ability to [selection: change default, query, modify, 
delete, [assignment: other operations]] the security attributes [assignment: a 
users configuration files or administrators configuration file] to [assignment: the 
authorised user]. 
Static attribute initialisation (FMT MSA.3) 
• (FMT _MSA.3.1): The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: (named) access con-
trol SFP] to provide [selection: restrictive] default values for security attributes 
that are used to enforce the SFP. 
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• (FMLMSA.3.2): The TSF shall allow the [assignment: the authorised admin-
istrator] to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when 
an object or infonmi.tion is created. 
Security roles (FMT _SMR.l) 
• (FMT _SMR.l.l ): The TSF shall maintain the roles [assignment: the administra-
tm; users]. 
• (FMT _SMR.l.2): The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles. 
A.6 Rationale 
A.6.1 Security Objectives Rationale 
A.6.1.1 Assumptions 
• A.ACCESS: All access to the TOE and its data is controlled by the Operating 
System (including TOE audit data). 
The environmental objective OE.OS ensures that the underlying operating sys-
tem provides required supporting services for the TOE. This includes controlling 
all access to the TOE and its data. 
• A. STORAGE: The Operating System provides secure storage for all TOE data 
·(including all TOE audit data). 
The environmental objective OE.OS ensures that the underlying operating sys-
tem provides required supporting services for the TOE. This includes secure 
storage for all TOE data such as configuration data, audit data, any appropriate 
security attributes, etc. 
• A.AUTHN: The Operating System will authenticate a user prior to granting ac-
cess to the TOE. 
The environmental objective OE.OS ensures that the underlying operating sys-
tem provides required supporting services for the TOE. This includes authenti-
cating user identity before granting access to the TOE. 
• A.IDENTITY: The Operating System provides the TOE with all required user 
identification information. 
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The environmental objective OE.OS ensures that the underlying operating sys-
tem provides required supporting services for the TOE. This includes providing 
user identity information to the TOE as required. 
• A.MALICIOUS: Downloaded files are checked by the Operating System to de-
termine if they contain malicious data. 
The environmental objective OE.OS ensures that the underlying operating sys-
tem provides required supporting services for the TOE. In particular, this in-
cludes determining if downloaded files contain malicious data. 
• A.ADMIN: System administrators manage the TOE and the information it con-
tains, and can be trusted not to abuse their privileges. 
The environmental objective OE.TRAIN ensures that the system administrators 
are adequately trained to manage and operate the TOE in a manner that maintains 
TOE security. 
• A. SERVER: The servers, with which the TOE interacts, are trustworthy. 
The environmental objective OE.SERVER stipulates that the TOE must be lim-
ited to interact with servers that are regarded as trustworthy (in terms of data 
confidentiality, data integrity, and file type specification), directly covering this 
assumption. 
• A.OSCNTRL: The Operating System securely controls all information exchange 
with the TOE. 
This assumption is covered with the environmental objective OE.OCNTRL which 
ensures that the Operating System with which the TOE interacts is able to secure 
and control all information exchanges. 
A.6.1.2 Threats 
• T.ABUSE: Authorised users may perform actions that are not permitted. 
This type of threat can occur as a result of either an intentional or accidental user 
action. One objective to use to counter this threat is O.AUDIT as it ensures that 
records of user security relevant activities are kept. Such records are necessary 
to enable later review and hold users accountable for their actions. The objective 
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O.AUDIT also supports prevention of this threat as users may not lmowingly per-
form actions that are not permitted if they lmow such actions are being recorded. 
The objective O.RESTRICT ensures that users are authenticated and limited to 
downloading permitted files and under appropriate security controls as set by 
the administrator, but also helps prevent user errors in this regard by submitting 
users to their own predefined settings. The proper configuration of the TOE, 
enforced by the environmental objective OE.OPERATE, directly counters this 
threat as it prevents such actions from being permitted in the first place. 
• T.ADMIN: Administrators may commit errors in installation, configuration, or 
management of the TOE, compromising security. 
In this SRP, administrators are assumed to be non-hostile. However, they still 
can make errors. This kind of threat is difficult to prevent, but detection will at 
least bring attention to the error which in turn can help alleviate the problem of 
administrator errors. The objective O.AUDIT addresses this threats by enabling 
detection and tracing of a security breach that occurs due to administrator error. 
The objective Prevention of this threat can be supported by training administra-
tors. Therefore the objective OE.TRAIN counters this threat as it requires that 
the administrators are properly trained, promoting secure operation ofthe TOE. 
• T.AUDIT: Users may pe1jorm undetected security relevant actions. 
This threat cannot be directly prevented, but it can be detected by analysing the 
audit trail record. The objective O.AUDIT addresses recording user's security 
relevant activities. 
• T.CAPTURE: A .file or data transferred between a remote server and the TOE 
may be exposed and captured by an illegitimate user. 
It is relatively easy to capture data during transmission. As it is impossible to 
prevent data capture without assuming control of the transmission media, the 
TOE must be capable of making the transmitted data unreadable to unauthorised 
entities. If the data is unreadable, then an attacker gains no knowledge of the 
data even if they obtain it. Specifically, if this is the case, then the data is not 
considered to be captured or exposed. Therefore this threat is addressed by the 
security objective O.CONFD which ensures that transmitted data or files are not 
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illegitimately obtained. The threat posed by traffic analysis of transmissions is 
not countered in this PP as it is not deemed to be sufficiently relevant to the 
focus of this PP. However, products similar in service to this TOE may provide 
additional security measures to address such concerns or such threats may be 
addressed by other products performing separate functions. 
• T.INTG: Modifications during transmission may lead to alteration of the file type 
or the transmitted data. 
Currently, the best way to counter this threat is to check transferred files and 
data to establish that their integrity has been maintained. The objective O.INTG 
provides for the required data and file integrity checking. 
• T.SPOOF: A server may be spoofed. 
Generally, it is difficult for a user or application accessing a server to detennine 
whether the server is being spoofed or not. To counter spoofing threats it is 
necessary to provide some way of verifying the identity of the server. The ob-
jective O.AUTHN directly counters this threat by enabling the servers identity to 
be authenticated. However, this service is optional but may be enforced by the 
administrator where considered necessary. 
• T.SWFLAW: TOE software flaws may allow users to download files of illicit .file 
type or result in the TOE forwarding the downloaded file to an inappropriate 
application. 
It is difficult to develop flawless software. This becomes even more difficult as 
the software becomes more complicated. One way to prevent and minimise 
flaws in software is to ensure that it is developed using sound implementa-
tion guidelines and practices. This is addressed by the environmental objective 
OE.OPERATE which may therefore be applied to counter this threat. More for-
mal software engineering techniques are not deemed appropriate for this TOE as 
the TOE itself relies on the correct operation of the underlying operating system 
and the associated software would be too complicated to permit such analysis. 
• T.CRASH: Human err01; a failure of software, hardware or environmental sup-
port (e.g. power failure) may cause an abrupt interruption to TOE operation. 
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This threat can be countered by ensuring the correct operation of the TOE with 
the objective OE.OPERATE and by ensuring that those responsible for provid-
ing services external to the TOE but necessary for its operation do all that they 
can to maintain them with the objective OE.SUPPORT. 
A.6.1.3 Organisational Security Policies 
• P.ACCOUNT: Users shall be held accountable for their actions. 
This policy simply states the requirement to provide for user actions to be trace-
able. In particular, the threat T.AUDIT focuses on the problem where user se-
curity relevant actions are not traceable. This threat is countered by O.AUDIT 
which covers the recording security relevant events and so partially meets this 
policy. However, to completely cover this policy, other user actions need to be 
traceable but this is beyond the scope ofO.AUDIT. Therefore, the environmental 
objective OE.ACCOUNT is selected to fully address this policy requirement 
A.6.2 Security Requirements Rationale 
The arguments given in this section demonstrate that the set of security requirements 
identified in Section 5 are suitable and appropriate to meet the security objectives iden-
tified in Section 4. 
O.AUDIT 
The TOE must provide the means for recording security relevant events to hold indi-
vidual users accountable for the actions they perform. 
To meet this objective, an audit record with the minimum of essential information 
consisting of the user identity, details of the action performed, and a reliable time 
stamp, is required. Note that the TOE is not itself responsible for the related services 
cove1ing the analysis and storage of the audit data as tllis data is passed back to be 
managed by the Operating System. Note that the requirement for the audit data to be 
securely transmitted to the Operating System (for analysis and storage) from the TOE 
has been included as an assumption (A.OSCNTRL). The following components are 
used to satisfy the objective: 
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Policy/Threat/ Assumption Objectives 
A.ACCESS OE.OS 
A. STORAGE OE.OS 
A.AUTHN OE.OS 
A.IDENTITY OE.OS 
A.MALICIOUS OE.OS 
A.ADMIN OE.TRAIN 
A. SERVER OE.SERVER 
T.ABUSE O.AUDIT, O.RESTRICT, OE.OPERATE 
T.ADMIN O.AUDIT, OE.TRAIN 
T.AUDIT O.AUDIT 
T.CAPTURE O.CONFD 
T.INTG O.INTG 
T.SPOOF O.AUTHN 
T.SWFLAW OE.OPERATE 
T.CRASH OE.OPERATE, OE.SUPPORT 
P.ACCOUNT O.AUDIT, OE.ACCOUNT 
Table A.4: Mapping the TOE Security Environment to Security Objectives 
1. FAU_GEN.l: This component defines the auditable events and generates a audit 
record providing the required audit information (see Table 2). By ensuring that 
reliable audit records are kept, administrators are able to use these records to 
detect the misuse or unauthorised activity of the users. 
2. FAU_GEN.2: This component links audit events and the users who cause the 
events. By having the reliable audit records including associated users, adminis-
trators are able to detect the misuse or unauthorised activity of the users. 
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Objectives Policy/Threat/ Assumptions 
O.AUDIT T.ABUSE, T.ADMIN, T.AUDIT, P.ACCOUNT 
O.RESTRICT T.ABUSE 
O.AUTHN T.SPOOF 
O.CONFD T.CAPTURE 
O.INTG T.INTG 
OE.OS A.ACCESS, A. STORAGE, A.AUTHN, A.IDENTITY, 
A.MALICIOUS 
OE.TRAIN A.ADMIN, T.ADMIN 
OE.SERVER A. SERVER 
OE.OPERATE T.ABUSE, T.CRASH 
OE.SUPPORT T.CRASH 
OE.ACCOUNT P.ACCOUNT 
Table A.5: Tracing of Security Objectives to the TOE Security Environment 
3. · FPT _STM.l: This component provides an accurate time that is recorded along 
with each security event. The reliable time is critical for audit records as they 
assist administrators to detect the sequence or/and pattem of the security related 
events. 
In summary, FAU_GEN.l defines the conditions for generation of the necessary 
audit records along with the associated user identity, provided by FAU_GEN.2. The 
record contains a time of the user's activity which is provided by the FTP _STM.l. 
Note that the assumption A.OSCNTRL enables the necessary time information to be 
obtained from the Operating System but that the TOE is responsible for linking the 
time of an event to other event details. 
O.RESTRICT 
The TOE must limit access to authorised users and to download of files of permitted 
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files type and in accordance to configurations requiring secured exchanges with remote 
server where any limitations imposed by the administrator override those of all users. 
This objective requires that users of the TOE are identified before accessing TOE 
services and that the file downloaded is a permitted files types (determined from the 
administrator and user configuration file) and that the connection is able to be properly 
secured. The TOE shall be able to establish a secure channel but it is also necessary 
that the remote server can support this service if it is required in the configuration file. 
The following components are included in order for the TOE to cover this objective. 
1. FIA_UID.2 User identification before any Action. 
This objective requires that users are identified before any other action is taken 
by the TOE. The identification information is provided to the TOE by the under-
lying operating system. Thus the TOE will not respond to any request from a 
user that has not been identified by the Operating System. 
2. FDP JFC.l Subset information flow control. 
This component ensures that all user request are subject to the identified rules 
of the File Download SFP. This will not permit users to mistakenly download 
files of file type that they do not wish to download or to either mistakenly or 
deliberately download files of a file type not permitted by the administrator. This 
is also holds for cases where secure communication has been stipulated by the 
user or administrator. 
3. FDP JFF.l Simple security attributes. 
This component supports the previous one and restricts all users to the rules 
outlined in the File Download SFP in regards to user identity, the file type and 
whether a secure connection for communicating the file is required. Subjects 
for this component are of two different type: subjects that cause the information 
flow and subjects that act as recipient of the information._ It also defines rules 
on information flow to be permitted or denied. By having security attributes and 
rules for the information flow, it is ensured that the file transmissions are only 
those allowed by the File Download SFP. 
In summary, FIA_UID.2 ensures that the user has been identified before they are 
able to access TOE services while FDP JFF.l and FDP JFC.l together ensure that the 
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information flows are subject to the rules defined in the File Download SFP. Note that 
the assumption A.OSCNTRL enables the necessary information regarding user iden-
tity and configuration file infom1ation to be obtained from the Operating System but 
that the TOE is responsible for limiting file transfer between the remote servers and 
the TOE subject to the File Download SFP. 
O.AUTHN 
The TOE must provide an authentication mechanism to verify the identity of servers 
with which it interacts. 
This objective requires that the TOE supports a mechanism to verify servers to 
gain a level of trust regarding their identity. The TOE shall use a secure channel in 
which the entire authentication process is accomplished. The following component is 
included in order for the TOE to implement the objective. 
1. FTP JTC.l Inter-TSF trusted channel. 
This component provides a communication channel separated from other chan-
nels and assures the identification of connecting servers. By having trusted chan-
nels, the TOE can securely authenticate a server and a level of trust is conse-
quently built for the data downloaded from the server. 
Note that the TSF is allowed to initiate the trusted channel but that this is only 
required when mandated within either the users or administrators configuration file, · 
subject to the condition that configurations of the administrator override those of the 
user. This enables service to be provided between servers that do not support estab-
lishment of a trusted channel but ensures that the TOE can support this service. 
O.CONFD 
The TOE must ensure that data or files can not be illegitimately obtained during trans-
mission. 
This objective aims to limit disclosure of the downloaded files to authorised users. 
To achieve this objective, the TOE shall provide a secure channel through which data 
are downloaded. In order to accomplish the objective, the following components have 
been selected for the TOE. 
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1. FTP .JTC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel 
This component provides a secure communication channel separated from other 
channels and assures that the information transmitted through this channel can 
not be obtained by any unintended recipient. In other words, having trusted 
channels ensures that the data, during transmission, can not be seen by any unau-
thorised users, therefore confidentiality of the transferred data is attained. 
2. FDP IFF.1 Simple security attributes 
This component ensures that all user requests are subject to their identity. This 
will not permit users to mistakenly access other users' downloaded files or con-
figuration files. 
Note that the TSF is allowed to initiate the trusted channel but that this is only 
required when mandated within either the users or administrators configuration file, 
subject to the condition that configurations of the administrator override those of the 
user. This enables service to be provided between servers that do not support estab-
lishment of a trusted channel but ensures that the TOE can support this service. 
O.INTG 
The TOE ensures the integrity of downloaded files and data is maintained during trans-
mission. 
This objective is required as it preserves the integrity ofthe data during transit from 
the remote server. Like some of other objectives, the objective is implemented using a 
trusted channel. The following components cover this objective. 
1. FTP .JTC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel 
This component provides a communication cham1el separated from other chan-
nels. A trusted channel will prevent unauthorised users from modifying the 
transmitted data in any way. 
Note that the TSF is allowed to initiate the trusted channel but that this is only 
required when mandated within either the users or administrators configuration file, 
subject to the condition that configurations of the administrator override those of the 
user. This enables service to be provided between servers that do not support estab-
lishment of a trusted channel but ensures that the TOE can support this service. 
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Objectives Security Functional Requirements 
O.AUDIT FAU_GEN.l, FAU_GEN.2, FPT_STM.l 
O.RESTRICT FIA_UID.2, FDP_IFF.l, FDP J:FC.l 
O.AUTHN FTP_ITC.l 
O.CONFD FTP_ITC.l 
O.INTG FTP J:TC.l 
Table A.6: Mapping of Objectives to Security Functional Requirements 
I Security Functional I Objectives 
FAU_GEN.l O.AUDIT 
FAU_GEN.2 O.AUDIT 
FDP_IFC.l O.RESTRICT 
FDP_IFF.l O.RESTRICT 
FIA_UID.2 O.RESTRICT 
FPT_STM.l O.AUDIT 
FTPJ:TC.l O.AUTHN, O.CONFD, O.INTG 
Table A.7: Tracing of the security Functional Requirements to the Security Objectives 
The SFRs, selected to meet the TOE objectives, can be seen in Table A.6 and 
Table A. 7. These requirements, in their entirety, have been selected from Part 2 of the 
Common Criteria (version 2.1). There is a single dependency (FMT_MSA.3) that has 
not been met by any of the SFRs for the TOE. This SFR and its dependencies outline 
requirements for managing the configuration files relating to the permitted file types for 
downloading and requirements for secure channel between the TOE and remote server 
for each user; They also outline the management functions associated to maintaining 
user identity associations to these configuration files. These services are beyond the 
simple function of the TOE and are controlled by the underlying Operating System. 
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For this reason they have been included as requirements for the IT environment. 
The set of functions selected to cover the TOE security objectives include: audit 
generation functions (FAD class), information flow control function (FDP class), re-
strictions for identification before any actions (FIA class), timing functions (FPT class) 
and trusted channel functions (FTP class). The TOE is responsible for audit generation 
but this is then passed back to the Operating System for processing. For this reason 
the TOE is not required to support any audit analysis tools or audit management func-
tions. Information flows from remote servers to the TOE must be subject to the rules 
outlined in the File Download SFP and this ensures the TOE objectives for permit-
ted file transfers are met. Even though the operating system ensures that all users are 
identified before access is granted to the TOE it should not be possible for anyone to 
circumvent this mechanism motivating the selection of the requirement covering iden-
tification before any TOE action. The timing function is simply related to enable the 
ability to closely link actions with the time that they occurred, an important aspect 
to support useful and relevant audit recording. Although not all connections to remote 
servers will require a trusted channel the provision of this service is central to the TOE. 
Although it would limit TOE usability to restrict all file transfers to be secured, it is 
essential to the TOE service to provide for some transfers that may contain sensitive 
material and therefore require sufficient security measures to be in place. 
A.6.3 Assurance Security Requirements Rationale 
This profile has been developed for circumstances where a moderate level of secu-
rity is required. The selected security level is identical to EAL3 which includes high 
level design and configuration management control, testing for all parts of the TOE, 
and documentation of the TOE. There are two issues to be considered in regards to 
the selection of the assurance level EAL3. Firstly, the TOE is dependent on the un-
derlying Operating System in terms of user identification, authentication, and access 
control and for data storage. Secondly, the TOE assists users downloading files from 
remote servers, some of which may be designated as trusted with communications be-
tween the TOE and the remote serves being secured. These components are therefore 
necessarily related components affecting the TOEs secure operation. In order to sup-
port and maintain the TOE's assurance level, the user identification and authentication 
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mechanism and the access control mechanism in underlying operating system, and the 
servers shall also have to have an appropriate EAL level of EAL3 or above. To match 
with current and expected best practice EAL3 is deemed appropriate as it provides a 
degree of assurance to support the secure interchange of files between trusted servers. 
A.6.4 Strength of Function 
While identification and authentication are handled by the underlying Operating Sys-
tem, a browser needs a trusted channel between servers and itself. Since the TOE 
security functions are realised by a probabilistic or permutation mechanism, the SOF 
medium level (adequate protection against straightforward or intentional breach of 
TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack potential) has been chosen. 
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Appendix B 
File Transfer Protocols 
B.l File Transfer Protocol (FTP) 
The file transfer protocol provides user level file transfer between two hosts. It allows 
convenient use of storage and sharing of files for two different types of file handling 
capability. FTP uses two specific sockets, one is for an initial connection protocol, and 
the other for standard data transferring and related operations [48]. 
B.l.l General Functionality 
FTP can be used indirectly (without login) or directly logging into a remote host. FTP 
has a mechanism for verifying user identity and passwords for exchange of access 
information. Usemame and password identifiers contain information of the respective 
identification and are sent by a user to a server when the connection is established. The 
server may se.nd the user an error message indicating an access control violation if it 
receives incorrect identification information. FTP remote login processes are portrayed 
in the figure B.l. 
FTP considers a file as an ordered set of arbitrary length composed with com-
puter data including system instructions [ 48]. The nature of infonnation in the file is 
not restricted by FTP, but it does indicate the type of data for parsing, interpretation, 
reconfiguration, and storage purposes. FTP allows the programmer to extend its com-
mands and transferable data types. A number of data types are defined by FTP but a 
host must accept the data transferred even if it does not recognise the data type. If this 
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Request for connection 
Request for user's ID and password 
Client Server 
User's ID and password 
Confirmation message 
Figure B.l: Login process ofFTP 
is the case, the data is treated as a bit stream (binary data). 
A file transferred by FTP may not come with access control attributes. It is a re-
sponsibility of a resident file system to provide the transferred files with access control 
attributes and protection. 
The Data Transfer Protocol (DTP) specified in RFC 171 [7] is used for transferring 
data in FTP. FTP transfers more than a single control transaction over the same con-
nection. There are a number of transaction types defined in RFC 171 but only a few of 
them are utilised for the FTP mechanism. In fact, there are only two types implied in 
FTP as listed below. 
• Type B9 - Transparent block-control 
• Type BA - Descriptor and counts-control 
With data transferring, FTP does not define the structure of files therefore it uses 
a file separator to indicate the end of the file. In indefinite bit streams where there 
is no file separator, the connection is closed at the end of the transaction. Control 
transactions include requests, identifiers, and tenninations. Control transactions can 
be distinguished by their first byte which is called "op code". 
A FTP request from a client host contains a unique pathname. The syntax of the 
pathname should comply with the server host convention. Common requests in FTP 
are store, retrieve, append; rename, and delete. It is necessary for a server to send an 
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acknowledgement if the transfer occurs between the server and the client. Any host 
can send an abort message to terminate the connection for any reason. For a more 
drastic type of abort, a host can close the connection. If this happens then the closing 
host has a responsibility to reopen the connection. 
B.1.2 Overview Analysis on Protocol Functions 
As a summary, FTP can identify users and provide the timing of the operation. The 
FTP protocol simply obtains these security related information with the help of the un-
derlying operating system. In fact, these functions, supported in FTP, are fundamental 
requirements for the underlying operating system. Hence, security in the FTP protocol 
is what the underlying operating system provides in terms of security measures. 
B.2 SCP and SSH 
The Secure Copy program is designed to facilitate file copying in a secure manner on 
networks. Secure Shell (SSH) is used for data transferring in SCP [38]. SCP and SSH 
work like FTP and TELNET, respectively. The difference is that data is transferred in 
plain text in FTP while SCP encrypts data for transmission. 
B.2.1 General Functionalities 
SSH provides a secure connection over insecure networks, that allows users to access 
to a remote host in a security means [38]. There are three security features which can 
be obtained from the SSH mechanism. 
Authentication of entity 
The users and the remote host can mutually authenticate in a number of different ways: 
password authentication, RSA authentication, Kerberos authentication, Rhost authen-
tication, or no authentication if desired. 
Integrity of data 
Data integrity is obtained when SSH computes a MAC (message authentication code) 
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and places it in every data packet [3 8]. 
Port forwarding security feature for other applications 
Some application's data stream can travel across networks under SSH protection. Their 
protocols use SSH port for transferring purpose. At the end of the channel, the appro-
priate port handles them for further processing. For example POP receives messages 
through SSH port (default number 22) in order to take advantage of SSH facilities- a 
secure channel. 
In order to provide the above security features, SSH consists of three protocols as 
follows: 
1. SSH transport layer protocol: Responsible for encryption, decryption, compression, 
and decompression. 
2. SSH connection protocol: Responsible for sending and receiving data. 
3. SSH authentication protocol: Responsible for authentication, handshaking, nego-
tiating cryptographic keys and algorithm. The detail communications involved in the 
authentication mechanism of SSH are depicted in Figure B.2. 
Authentication Request 
Host key + Server key 
Client Server 
Session kev 
Confirm message 
Figure B.2: Login process of SSH 
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B.2.2 SCP and SSH collaboration 
When SCP commands are invoked, SSH's authentication is activated and prompts a 
user for password or passphrase [38]. After successful authentication, the user com-
mand is placed in the payload field of a SSH data packet and that is sent under the 
control of SSH. The result of the command comes back in the same way as well. This 
process enables the user to proceed with normal copying file processes with additional 
security. The security attributes for the file copied can be preserved from the server 
system. 
B.2.3 Overview Analysis on Protocol Functions 
The SCP protocol fully provides three security functions: identification and authenti-
cation, timing functions, and trusted channel functions. It has also partially supported 
the information flow control functions by enabling preservation of default security at-
tributes of the transferred files. However, the user can lose some features (due to the 
problem in attributes translation) if the file system mechanisms ofhosts are different. If 
a supplementary security features (such as a fully functional access control mechanism 
and generating audit data) are available, then this protocol could be a better protocol 
for data transferring purposes. 
B.3 Case study on FTAM 
FTAM (File Transfer, Access, and Management protocol) is a specification for file 
transfer protocols that could be used between two hosts with incompatible file systems 
(e.g., Windows file system and Unix file system) [36]. 
B.3.1 General Functionality 
FTAM provides file service mechanisms in relation to file transfer, access, and man-
agement of the file in an "Open System Interconnection" environment. However, these 
features are optional and an implementation design may choose only some of which 
according to their requirements. Such implementations could become incompatible 
with other implementations due to the selection of different services. This problem is 
overcome with the International Standardised Profile (ISO/IEC ISP 1 0607) by defining 
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some FTAM file services as mandatory. The main entities in FTAM services [14] are 
outlined in the following sections. 
B.3.2 FTAM Virtual Filestore 
The core feature of the FTAM file service is a virtual filestore (VFS). The VFS de-
scribes files and their attributes. The VFS makes a file understandable by the different 
real file systems of hosts. For this service, the local file system is required to map 
the VFS to the local filestore. The VFS stores a file with file attributes, data units 
(representing the contents of the file), and file structuring information. 
The two parties involved in the FTAM transaction are called the initiator and the 
responder. The initiator is the controlling party that initiates an activity such as the file 
data transfer or file maintenance operations. The other party, the responder, performs 
an action in response to the request of the initiator. In other words, the initiator acts 
as a client and a responder as a server. The FTAM file service model is illustrated in 
Figure B.3. 
B.3.3 File Attributes 
FTAM classifies a set of attributes that describe the characteristics and contents of a 
file. Most of the file attributes are set for the file at the time of creation and only 
some of them can be modified later. All attributes may not relevant to the real filestore 
mechanism in the responder system. Attributes are therefore grouped based on the 
their characteristics in terms of an essential or optional requirement. For the initiator, 
the FTAM service provider must support all attribute groups in order to accept and 
supply values for all FTAM file attributes to the file received from a remote server. 
B.3.4 Kernel Group 
Attributes in this group are essential and must be supported. A FTAM responder stores 
these attributes and returns values to an initiator. The essential attributes composed in 
the kernel group are: 
1. File name: There are no semantics specified by ISP for this attribute. It is used for 
mapping to the real file system, hence, it is a local issue. 
2. Permitted actions: This attribute has two parts. One part identifies a set of actions, 
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Figure B.3: FTAM File Service Model 
e.g., read, and the other part specifies the set ofFADU (File Access Data Unit) identity 
style, e.g., traversal. This unalterable attribute is set at the time of file creation. 
3. Contents type: This attribute describes the file structure and the content data. This 
unchangeable attribute is set when the file is created. 
B.3.5 Storage Group 
This attribute group is optional for a responder. These options are: 
1. Storage account: Identifies user accountable for charges regarding the storing file. 
2. Histmy attributes: Indicates the date and time of access to a file that includes cre-
ation, modification, and read access. 
3. File availability: An indication made by initiators to access a file stored on a non-
demountable device or a demountable device, the value of which is immediately avail-
able in the case of a non-demountable device, or, deferred available respectively. 
4. Filesize: A file size given in bytes and set by the FTAM responder after an modifi-
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cation or extension is made. 
5 .Future filesize: A maximum size to which a file can grow. 
B.3.6 Security Group 
This attributes group is also optional for a responder. 
1. Access control: This attribute consists of a set of elements specifying one access 
condition (e.g., location of initiator, password requirement, etc.) in each element. Ac-
cess is denied unless one match is found during checking against the list of access 
elements. This changeable attribute is set when the file is created. 
2. Legal qualification: This attribute describes the legal status of the file in terms of 
data protection legislation. The FTAM specification does not provide detailed use of 
this attribute. 
B.3.7 Private Group 
This optional group contains a single attribute - private use. The FTAM specification 
makes no definition of this attribute. 
B.3.8 Document Types 
VFS defines a file using a :flexible file model that provides predefined simple and com-
mon file types. In this model the attributes, structure, and contents of the file are de-
scribed independently from the real filestore. A document type specifies rules for the 
file in tem1s of structure (named constraint set) and content (named abstract syntax). 
Four common document types defined in FTAM standard are: 
• FTAM -1, an unstructured text file document type 
• FTAM-2, a sequential text file document type 
• FTAM-3, an unstructured binary file document type 
• FTAM-4, a sequential binary file document type 
Additional document types can be added if national registration authorities corrob-
orate. 
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B.3.9 File Actions 
File actions can be categorised into two classes as listed below. 
1. Actions affecting the entire file: create file, select file, deselect file, read attributes, 
change attributes, open file, close file, delete file. 
2. Actions affecting the individual FADUs: locate, read, insert, replace, extend, and 
erase. 
B.3.10 Services and Protocol Functions 
Activities and Regimes 
The initiator forms an application association when a positive response, sent by a re-
sponder, is received. That indicates that an activity is started. During the protocol 
activity, states - lmown as regimes - are used to track the action permitted. There are 
four regimes defined as follows: 
• FTAM regime - subsists while the application association is being presented. 
• File selection regime - subsists while a named file is selected. 
• File open regime- subsists while individual FADUs are in effect. 
• Data transfer regime - subsists while a bulk of data transferring occurs. 
There are a number of attributes that are associated with FTAM activities, but all 
are not valid for every regime. These attributes are logically grouped as follows: 
• Kernel group - Active content type, current access request, current initiator iden-
tity, current location, current processing mode, current calling application entity 
title, current responding application entity title. 
• Storage group - Current account, current concurrency control, current locking 
style. 
e Security group - Current access passwords, active legal qualifications. 
F-initialise functionality 
This file service initiates an FTAM application association with a responder. Three 
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parameters, initiator identity, account, and filestore password, are required. 
F -create functionality 
This file service creates a new file and assigns file attributes. The associated parameters 
of this service are account, create password, and override. The latter one is required 
only if the file to be created is already existed. 
B.3.11 Overview Analysis on Protocol Functions 
FTAM can authenticate users and record the time of operations just like FTP. In ad-
dition, the flow of infonnation between two parties is also controlled by FTAM using 
file access control attributes. The protocol itself can not generate audit data and it does 
not provide any mechanism to set up the secure channel between hosts. 
B.4 Protocol Comparison and Analysis 
The protocols comparison has conducted to see if a protocol has the security com-
ponents identified in the security requirements profile for file downloading, which is 
explained in detail in Chapter 4. The protection profile addresses security issues under 
five functions as follows: 
• Audit generation functions: mechanisms to generate audit log. 
• Information flow control functions: mechanisms to impose limitations imposed 
by organisational policies. 
• Identification restrictions functions: mechanisms to verify user identification. 
• Timing functions: mechanisms to provide the time of users' activities to the audit 
generation functions. 
• Trusted channel functions: mechanisms to establish a secure connection between 
hosts. 
The HTTP/TLS collaborative protocol effectively offers 3 security features- user 
identification and authentication, and secure channel. It is predictable as the conven-
tional functionalities of HTTP are to support any kind of data transferring and TLS to 
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I Components I HTTP/TLS I FTP I SCP/SSH I FTAM I 
Audit generation functions No No No No 
Information flow control functions No No No Yes 
Identification restrictions functions Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Timing functions No No No No 
Trusted channel functions Yes No No No 
Table B.l: Protocols and Security Requirements Relationship 
provide a secure channel. The web-based protocol, HTTP over TLS (HTTPS), obvi-
ously allows users to perform data transferring under limited security. 
FTP provides users with only one function, user identification restriction functions. 
It is a bottom-line security feature and is really fulfilled by the operating system. Thus, 
it appears that the FTP provides services that are very vulnerable security wise. 
The SCP protocol, using SSH facilities, possesses two security measures. Like the 
other protocols discussed above, user identification and authentication (the basic se-
curity mechanism) are available. More options (e.g., password, RSA authentication, 
etc.,) are implemented in order to support users with many levels of security. The secu-
rity channel would be attained as SSH uses its administratively assigned port number 
(default 22) with data encryption/decryption. 
The analysis of FTAM protocol yields two security benefits for users. They are 
user identification restrictions function and information flow control function. There 
is no service in FTAM to facilitate a secure trusted channel within its hosts, but FTAM 
provides the security at other Open System Interconnection (OSI) layers (3, 4, Or 7, as 
appropriate). 
The table B.1 illustrates the protocols and their supported security requirements of 
the PP. 
According to the table above, some of the security functional requirements that we 
consider critical are not provided by the protocols utilised in current file downloading 
applications. Note that none of them provides for the required audit data generation 
function. 
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